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WARD CHURCHILL*
The Law Stood Squarely on Its
Head:  U.S. Legal Doctrine,
Indigenous Self-Determination
and the Question of World
Order
It’s a travesty of a mockery of a sham.
Groucho Marx
As anyone who has ever debated or negotiated with U.S. of-ficials on matters concerning American Indian land rights
can attest, the federal government’s first position is invariably
that its title to/authority over its territoriality was acquired incre-
mentally, mostly through provisions of cession contained in some
400 treaties with Indians ratified by the Senate between 1778 and
1871.1  When it is pointed out that the U.S.2 has violated the
* Ward Churchill (Keetoowah Cherokee) is Chair of the Department of Ethnic
Studies and Professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Colorado/
Boulder.  Among his numerous books are:  SINCE PREDATOR CAME:  NOTES FROM
THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDIAN LIBERATION (1995), A LITTLE MATTER OF
GENOCIDE:  HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT
(1997) and, most recently, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE:  INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (2002).
1 See  Indian Treaties, 1778-1883 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1973) (a compilation of
the texts of 371 ratified treaties).  Another thirty ratified treaty texts, as well as the
texts of 400 additional treaties, all of them unratified but many purportedly forming
the basis for U.S. assertions of title to particular chunks of territory, can be found in
Documents of American Indian Diplomacy:  Treaties, Agreements and Conven-
tions, 1775-1979 (Vine Deloria, Jr. & Raymond J. DeMallie eds., 1999).  On the
pattern of U.S. treaty violations, see VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF
BROKEN TREATIES:  AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Univ. of Texas
Press, Austin 1985) (1974).
2 Deviation from THE BLUEBOOK abbreviation Rule 6.1 due to author’s prefer-
ence. See THE BLUEBOOK:  A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.6.1, at 49 (Colum-
bia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
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terms of every one of the treaties at issue, thus voiding whatever
title might otherwise have accrued therefrom, there are usually a
few moments of thundering silence.3  The official position, pub-
licly framed by perennial “federal Indian expert” Leonard Gar-
ment as recently as 1999, is then shifted onto different grounds:
“If you don’t accept the treaties as valid, we’ll have to fall back
on the Doctrine of Discovery and Rights of Conquest.”4  This
rejoinder, to all appearances, is meant to be crushing, forestalling
further discussion of a topic so obviously inconvenient to the sta-
tus quo.
While the idea that the U.S. obtained title to its “domestic
sphere” by discovery and conquest has come to hold immense
currency among North America’s settler population, one finds
that the international legal doctrines from which such notions de-
rive are all but unknown, even among those holding degrees in
law, history or political philosophy.  The small cadre of arguable
exceptions to the rule have for the most part not bothered to
become acquainted with the relevant doctrines in their original
or customary formulations, instead contenting themselves with
reviewing the belated and often transparently self-serving “inter-
pretations” produced by nineteenth century American jurists,
most notably those of John Marshall, third Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.5  Overall, there seems not the least desire—or
sense of obligation—to explore the matter further.
The situation is altogether curious, given Marshall’s own bed-
rock enunciation of America’s self-concept, the hallowed pro-
position that the U.S. should be viewed above all else as “a
government of laws, and not of men.”6  Knowledge of/compli-
ance with the law is presupposed, of course, in any such construc-
3 The customary law from which this principle is adduced is codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature  May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].  For analysis, see SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 1-21 (2d ed. 1984).  For further amplification of the fact that
the customary principles set forth in the Vienna Convention were very much in ef-
fect at the time U.S. Indian treaties were negotiated, see SAMUEL BENJAMIN CRAN-
DALL, TREATIES:  THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916).
4 For background on Garment, see PAUL CHAAT SMITH & ROBERT ALLEN WAR-
RIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE:  THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO
WOUNDED KNEE 164-65, 174 (1996).
5 For a succinct overview of the series of opinions involved, see JILL NORGREN,
THE CHEROKEE CASES:  THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND POLITICS (1996).
6 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  For analysis, see JEAN
EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL:  DEFENDER OF A NATION 309-26 (1996) (for the
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tion of national image.  This is especially true with respect to laws
which, like those pertaining to discovery and conquest, form the
core of America’s oft and loudly-proclaimed contention that its
acquisition and consolidation of a transcontinental domain has
all along been “right,” “just” and therefore “legal.”7  Indeed,
there can be no questions of law more basic than those of the
integrity of the process by which the United States has asserted
title to its land-base and thereby purports jurisdiction over it.
The present essay addresses these questions, examining U.S.
performance and the juridical logic attending it through the lens
of contemporaneous international legal custom and convention,
and drawing conclusions accordingly. The final section explores
the conceptual and material conditions requisite to a reconcilia-
tion of rhetoric and reality within the paradigm of explicitly
American legal (mis)understandings.  It should be noted, how-
ever, that insofar as so much of this devolves upon international
law, and with the recent emergence of the U.S. as “the world’s
only remaining superpower,”8 the implications are not so much
national as global.
I
THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY
Although there are precursors dating back a further 200 years,
the concepts which were eventually systematized as discovery
doctrine for the most part originated in a series of Bulls promul-
gated by Pope Innocent IV during the late thirteenth century to
elucidate material relations between Christian crusaders and Is-
lamic “infidels.”9  While the pontiff’s primary objective was to
establish a legal framework compelling “Soldiers of the Cross” to
reference to the United States as a “nation governed by laws, not men,” see page
325).
7 See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND, WHITE MAN’S LAW:  THE
PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (Univ. of Okla. Press:  Nor-
man & London 1995) (1971).
8 For use of the phrase employed here, see WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE STATE:  A
GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER (2000).
9 One prefiguration came in 1066 A.D., when Pope Alexander I recognized the
conquest of Saxon England, vesting underlying fee title to English land in the Nor-
man King William. See CARL ERDMANN, THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF CRUSADE
150-60 (Marshall W. Baldwin & Walter Goffart trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1977)
(1935).  On the Innocentian Bulls, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 43-49, 59-
60, 64-67, 69-72 (1990).
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deliver the fruits of their pillage abroad to such beneficiaries as
the Vatican and Church-sanctioned heads of Europe’s incipient
states, the Innocentian Bulls embodied the first formal acknowl-
edgment in Western law that rights of property ownership were
enjoyed by non-Christians as well as Christians.  “In Justice,”
then, it followed that only those ordained to rule by a “Divine
Right” conferred by the “One True God” were imbued with the
prerogative to “rightly” dispossess lesser mortals of their lands
and other worldly holdings.10
The law remained as it was until 1492, when the Columbian
“discovery” of what proved to be an entire hemisphere, very
much populated but of which most Europeans had been una-
ware, sparked a renewed focus upon questions of whether and to
what extent Christian sovereigns might declare proprietary inter-
est in the assets of others.11  Actually, the first problem was
whether the inhabitants of the “New World” were endowed with
“souls,” the criterion of humanity necessary for us to be accorded
any legal standing at all.  This issue led to the famous 1550 debate
in Valladolid between Frey Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan
Ginés de Sepúlveda, the outcome of which was papal recognition
that American Indians were human beings and therefore entitled
to exercise at least rudimentary rights.12
As a corollary to the Valladolid proceedings, Spanish legal the-
orists such as Franciscus de Vitoria and Juan Matı́as de Paz were
busily revising and expanding upon Innocent’s canonical founda-
tion as a means of delineating the property rights vested in those
“discovered” by Christian (i.e., European) powers as well as
those presumably obtained in the process by their “discover-
ers.”13  In the first instance, Vitoria in particular posited the prin-
10 Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of
American Indians in Western Legal Thought , 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983). See also
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1954); HER-
BERT ANDREW DEANE, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE
(1963).
11 See , e.g. , TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA:  THE QUESTION
OF THE OTHER 146-67 (Richard Howard, trans. Harper & Row 1984).
12 For probably the best and most detailed analysis of the debate, see LEWIS
HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS: A STUDY IN RACE PREJUDICE IN
THE MODERN WORLD (1959).
13 See generally JAMES MULDOON, POPES, LAWYERS AND INFIDELS:  THE CHURCH
AND THE NON-CHRISTIAN WORLD, 1250-1550 (Edward Peters ed., 1979). See also
L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD
(1989); Etienne Grisel, The Beginnings of International Law and General Public
Law Doctrine:  Francisco de Vitoria’s De Indiis prior , in  1 FIRST IMAGES OF
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ciple that sovereigns acquired outright title to lands discovered
by their subjects only when the territory involved was found to
be literally unoccupied (terra nullius).14  Since almost none of the
land European explorers ever came across genuinely met this
description, the premise of territorium res nullius , as it was called,
was essentially moot from the outset (albeit, as will become ap-
parent, the English—and much more so their American off-
shoot—would later twist it to their own ends).
In places found to be inhabited, it was unequivocally acknowl-
edged in law that native residents held inherent or “aboriginal”
title to the land.15  What the discoverer obtained was a monopo-
listic right vis-à-vis other powers to acquire the property from its
native owners, in the event they could be persuaded through
peaceful means to alienate it.  On balance, the formulation seems
to have been devised more than anything as an attempt to order
the relations between the European states in such a way as to
prevent them from shredding one another in a mad scramble to
glean the lion’s share of the wealth all of them expected to flow
from the Americas.16
Under the right of discovery, the first European nation to dis-
cover American [or other] lands previously unknown to Eu-
rope had what is similar to an exclusive European franchise to
negotiate for Indian land within the discovered [area].  Inter-
national law forbade European nations from interfering in the
diplomatic affairs which each carried on with the Indian na-
tions within their respective “discovered” territories.  The doc-
trine thus reduced friction and the possibility of warfare
between the competing European nations.17
AMERICA 305-25 (Fredi Chiapelli ed., 1976); LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUG-
GLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA (1949).
14 See generally  Antonio Truyol y Serra, The Discovery of the New World and
International Law , 1971 U. TOL. L. REV. 305 (covering the original conception).
15 See  Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the United States , 31
GEO. L.J. 1 (1942); Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title , 32 MINN. L. REV. 28
(1947); Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign:  Aboriginal Title Recon-
sidered , 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980).
16 At least one scholar has contended that the arrangement was designed only  to
regulate relations between European states and carried no negative connotations
vis-à-vis native standing at all.  Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes ,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1.
17 Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights:  A
Study of Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination , in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 15,
16 (Nat’l Lawyers Guild Comm. on Native American Struggles et al. ed., 1982).
Such divvying up of turf amounted to a universalization of the principle expounded
by Pope Alexander VI in his Bull Inter Caetera  of May 4, 1493, dividing interests in
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That this principle was well-developed in international law and
understood perfectly by America’s “Founding Fathers” is con-
firmed in an observation by no less luminous a figure than
Thomas Jefferson:
We consider it as established by the usage of different nations
into a kind of Jus gentium  for America, that a white nation
settling down and declaring that such and such are their limits,
makes an invasion of those limits by any other white nation an
act of war, but gives no right of soil against the native
possessors.18
“[T]hat is to say, [we hold simply] the sole and exclusive right
of purchasing [land] from [indigenous peoples within our ostensi-
ble boundaries] whenever they should be willing to sell.”19  The
requirement that the consent of indigenous peoples was needed
to legitimate cessions of their land was what prompted European
states to begin entering into treaties with “the natives” soon after
the invasion of North America had commenced in earnest.20
While thus comprising the fundamental “real estate documents”
through which the disposition of land title on the continent must
be assessed, treaties between European and indigenous nations
also served to convey formal recognition by each party that the
other was its equal in terms of legal stature (“sovereignty”).21  To
quote Jefferson again, “the Indians [have] full, undivided and in-
dependent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and . . .
this might be forever.”22  Or, as U.S. Attorney General William
Wirt would put it in 1828:
[Be it] once conceded, that the Indians are independent to the
purpose of treating, their independence is, to that purpose , as
absolute  as that of any other nation. . . . Nor can it be con-
ceded that their independence as a nation is a limited indepen-
dence. . . . Like all other independent nations, they have the
absolute power of war and peace.  Like all other independent
the southern hemisphere of the New World between Spain and Portugal. See WIL-
LIAMS, supra  note 9, at 80-81.
18 WASHBURN, supra  note 7, at 56 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
19 Id.
20 See EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS:  TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789
(Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1979).  For further analysis, see DOROTHY V. JONES, LI-
CENSE FOR EMPIRE:  COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA (1982).
21 See  Vienna Convention, supra  note 3, art. 2(1)(a) (stating “‘Treaty’ means an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law.”).
22 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE
YEARS:  THE TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834 141 (1970).
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nations, their territory is inviolable by any other sover-
eignty. . . . They are entirely self-governed—self-directed.
They treat, or refuse to treat, at their pleasure; and there is no
human power which can rightfully control . . . their discretion
in this respect.23
From early on, the English had sought to create a loophole by
which to exempt themselves in certain instances from the neces-
sity of securing land title by treaty, and to undermine the discov-
ery rights of France, whose New World settlement patterns were
vastly different from those of England.24  Termed the “Norman
Yoke,” the theory was that an individual—or an entire people—
could rightly claim only such property as they had converted
from wilderness to a state of domestication (i.e., turned into town
sites, placed in cultivation, and so forth).25  Without regard for
indigenous methods of land use, it was declared that any area
found to be in an “undeveloped” condition could be declared
terra nullius  by its discoverer and clear title thus claimed.26  By
extension, any discovering power such as France which failed to
pursue development of the sort evident in the English colonial
model forfeited its discovery rights accordingly.27
The Puritans of Plymouth Plantation and Massachusetts Bay
23 Op. Att’y Gen.  613-18, 623-33 (1828).  Later theorists, mainly positivists like
Westlake and Hyde, argued that treaties with Indians and other “backward” peoples
did not carry the same force and effect as treaties between “civilized” states. See ,
e.g. , CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED BY THE
UNITED STATES 163-64 (1922).  However, there is nothing in the interpretation of
customary law codified in the Vienna Convention to support their views.
24 In substance, where the English sought ultimately to displace or supplant indig-
enous peoples altogether, the French ambition was to harness modified versions of
existing native economies to their own profit. See HUGH EDWARD EGERTON, A
SHORT HISTORY OF BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 164-65 (6th ed. 1920); see also
CHARLES J. BALESI, THE TIME OF THE FRENCH IN THE HEART OF NORTH AMERICA,
1673-1818 (1992); KLAUS E. KNORR, BRITISH COLONIAL THEORIES, 1570-1850 63-
104 (2d ed. 1963).
25 WILLIAMS, supra  note 9, at 233-80.
26 The idea has yielded a still-lingering effect.  Its basic premise plainly underlay
the 1862 Homestead Act by which any U.S. citizen could claim a quarter-section
(160 acres) of “undeveloped” land, merely by paying a nominal “patent fee” to off-
set the expense of registering it.  Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).  S/he then
had a specified period of time, usually five years, to fell trees, build a house, plow
fields, etc. Id.  If these requirements were met within the time allowed, the home-
steader was issued a deed to the property. Id.  While it remains “on the books,”
claims under the Act were last pressed to a significant extent in Alaska during the
1960s and early 1970s.
27 Such reasoning formed a portion of the legal basis upon which England waged
four wars against the French in North America:  King William’s War (1689-1697),
Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713), King George’s War (1744-1748) and the “Seven
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Colony experimented with the idea during the early seventeenth
century—arguing that while native property rights might well be
vested in their towns and fields, the remainder of their territories,
since it was uncultivated, should be considered unoccupied and
thus unowned—but the precedent never evolved into a more
generalized English practice.28  Indeed, the Puritans themselves
abandoned such presumption in 1629.29
Whatever theoretical conflicts existed concerning the nature
of the respective ownership rights of Indians and Europeans
to land in America, practical realities shaped legal relations
between the Indians and colonists.  The necessity of getting
along with powerful Indian [peoples], who outnumbered the
European settlers for several decades, dictated that as a mat-
ter of prudence, the settlers buy lands that the Indians were
willing to sell, rather than displace them by other methods.
The result was that the English and Dutch colonial govern-
ments obtained most of their lands by purchase.  For all practi-
cal purposes, the Indians were treated as sovereigns possessing
full ownership rights to the lands of America.30
So true was this that by 1750 England had dispatched a de
facto ambassador to conduct regularized diplomatic relations
with the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois Six Nations Confederacy)31
and, in 1763, in an effort to quell native unrest precipitated by his
subjects’ encroachments upon unceded lands, King George III
issued a proclamation prohibiting English settlement west of the
Allegheny Mountains.32  This foreclosure of the speculative in-
terests in “western lands” held by George Washington and other
members of the settler élite—and the less grandiose aspirations
Years War,” which actually lasted fourteen years (1749-1763). See ALBERT MAR-
RIN, STRUGGLE FOR A CONTINENT:   FRENCH AND INDIAN WARS, 1690-1760 (1987).
28 ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER:  PURITANS AND INDIANS,
1620-1675 113-21 (1965).
29 Letter from the Massachusetts Bay Company to Governor John Endicott, Apr.
17, 1629, in  1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMPANY OF THE MASSACHU-
SETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 231 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, M.D. ed., 1853).
30 FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 55 (Rennard Strick-
land & Charles F. Wilkinson eds., 1982).
31 See generally JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, LORD OF THE MOHAWKS:  A BIOGRA-
PHY OF SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON (Little, Brown & Co. 1979) (1959).
32 This was following England’s final victory over France in the last of the so-
called French and Indian Wars. See supra  text accompanying note 27.  On the Proc-
lamation of 1763 (RSC 1970, App. II, No. 1, at 127) and subsequent legislation, see
JACK STAGG, ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA TO 1763 AND AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 7 OCTOBER 1763 (1981). See also
BRUCE CLARK, NATIVE LIBERTY, CROWN SOVEREIGNTY:  THE EXISTING ABORIGI-
NAL RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 134-46 (1990).
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to landed status of rank-and-file colonials—would prove a major
cause of the American War of Independence.33
Although it is popularly believed in the U.S. that the 1783
Treaty of Paris through which England admitted defeat also con-
veyed title to all lands east of the Mississippi River to the victori-
ous insurgents, the reality was rather different.  England merely
quitclaimed its interest in the territory at issue.  All the newly-
established American republic thus acquired was title to such
property as England actually owned—the area of the original
thirteen colonies situated east of the 1763 demarcation line—plus
an exclusive right to acquire such property as native owners
might be convinced to cede by treaty as far westward as the Mis-
sissippi.34  The same principle pertained to the subsequent “terri-
torial acquisitions” from European or Euro-derivative
countries—the 1803 Louisiana Purchase and the 1848 impound-
ment of the northern half of Mexico through the Treaty of
Guadelupe Hidalgo, to cite two prominent examples—through
which the present territoriality of the forty-eight contiguous
states was eventually consolidated.35
As a concomitant to independence, moreover, the Continental
Congress found itself presiding over a pariah state, defiance—
much less forcible revocation—of Crown authority being among
the worst offenses imaginable under European law. Unable to
obtain recognition of its legitimacy in other quarters,36 the fed-
eral government was compelled for nearly two decades to seek it
through treaties of peace and friendship with indigenous nations
along its western frontier—all of them recognized as sovereigns
in prior treaties with the very European powers then shunning
the U.S.—meanwhile going to extravagant rhetorical lengths to
demonstrate that, far from being an outlaw state, it was really the
most legally-oriented of all nations.37
33 THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (Russell & Russell 1959) (1937).
34 For the complete text of the Treaty of Paris (Sept. 3, 1783), see THE RECORD OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY:  DOCUMENTS AND READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF U.S.
FOREIGN RELATIONS 39-42 (Ruhl F. Bartlett ed., 4th ed. 1964).
35 For the text of the Treaty Between the United States and France for the Cession
of Louisiana (Apr. 30, 1803), see id.  at 116-17.  On similar acquisitions, see generally
DAVID M. PELCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF ANNEXATION: TEXAS, OREGON AND THE
MEXICAN WAR (1973).
36 See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION:  A
BIOGRAPHY 300 (1970).
37 See  Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty , in
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The fledgling country could hardly peddle a strictly law-abid-
ing image while openly trampling upon the rights of indigenous
peoples.  As a result, although George Washington had secretly
and successfully recommended the opposite policy even before
being sworn in as president,38 one of the earliest acts of Congress
was to pass the Northwest Ordinance, in which it solemnly
pledged that “the utmost good faith shall always be observed to-
wards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken
without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty,
they shall never be invaded or disturbed.”39  For the most part,
then, it was not until the U.S. had firmed up its diplomatic ties
with France, and the demographic/military balance in the west
had begun to shift decisively in its favor,40 that it started to make
serious inroads on native lands.
Economic Development in American Indian Reservations 22-28 (Roxanne Dunbar
Ortiz & Larry Emerson eds., 1979). See also supra  text accompanying note 6 for an
example of hyperlegal posturing.
38 This concerns a written plan submitted to the Congress in which the “Father of
his Country” recommended using treaties with Indians in much the same fashion
Hitler would later employ them against his adversaries at Münich and elsewhere
(i.e., to lull them into a false sense of security or complacency which placed them at
a distinct military disadvantage when it came time to confront them with a war of
aggression).
Apart from the fact that it was immoral, unethical and actually criminal,
this plan placed before the Congress by George Washington was so logical
and well laid out that it was immediately accepted practically without op-
position and at once put into action.  There might be—almost certainly
would  be—further strife with the Indians, new battles and new wars, but
the end result was, with the adoption of Washington’s plan, inevitable:
Without even realizing it had occurred, the fate of all Indians in the country
was sealed.  They had lost virtually everything.
ALLAN W. ECKERT, THAT DARK AND BLOODY RIVER:  CHRONICLES OF THE OHIO
RIVER VALLEY 441 (1995).
39 1 Stat. 50 (1789).  For background, see generally PRUCHA, supra  note 22.
40 As the indigenous population was steadily eroded by disease and ad hoc attri-
tional warfare all along the frontier, plummeting to only a few hundred thousand by
1812, the United States population had swelled to 7.5 million.  While the U.S. could
field 12,000 regulars and at least four times as many militiamen, even the broad
alliance attempted by Tecumseh figured to muster fewer than 5,000 fighters in re-
sponse.  For U.S. population data, see 1 NILES WEEKLY REG. (Nov. 30, 1811).  On
native population size, see HENRY F. DOBYNS, THEIR NUMBERS BECOME THINNED:
NATIVE AMERICAN POPULATION DYNAMICS IN EASTERN NORTH AMERICA (1983).
On U.S. troop strength, see J.C.A. Stagg, Enlisted Men in the United States Army,
1812-1815:  A Preliminary Survey , 43 WM. & MARY Q. 615 (1986).  On Tecumseh’s
alliance, see ALLAN W. ECKERT, A SORROW IN OUR HEART:  THE LIFE OF TECUM-
SEH (1992).
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II
THE MARSHALL OPINIONS
The preliminary legal pretext for U.S. expansionism, set forth
by John Marshall in his 1810 Fletcher v. Peck  opinion,41
amounted to little more than a recitation of the Norman Yoke
theory, quite popular at the time with Jefferson and other Ameri-
can leaders.42  The proposition that significant portions of Indian
Country amounted to terra nullius , and were thus open to asser-
tion of U.S. title without native agreement, was, however, contra-
dicted by the country’s policy of securing by treaty at least an
appearance of indigenous consent to the relinquishment of each
parcel brought under federal jurisdiction.43  The presumption of
underlying native land title lodged in the Doctrine of Discovery
thus remained the most vexing barrier to America’s fulfillment of
its territorial ambitions.
In the 1823 Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh  case,44
Marshall therefore undertook a major (re)interpretation of the
doctrine itself.  While demonstrating a thorough mastery of the
law as it had been previously articulated, and an undeniable abil-
ity to draw all the appropriate conclusions therefrom, the Chief
Justice nonetheless managed to invert it completely.  Although
41 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).  To all appearances, the opinion was an expedient
means to facilitate redemption of scrip issued to troops during the American inde-
pendence struggle in lieu of cash.  These vouchers were to be exchanged for land
parcels in Indian Country once victory had been achieved (Marshall and his father
received instruments entitling them 10,000 acres apiece in what is now Kentucky,
part of the more than 200,000 acres they jointly amassed there).  On the Marshalls’
Kentucky land transactions, see JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL:  DEFINER
OF A NATION 74-75 (1996).  On the case itself, see C. PETER MCGRATH, YAZOO:
THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966).
42 Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, the Norman Yoke, and American Indian
Lands , 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (1987).  It should be noted that the notion that the
concept of terra nullius  might ever have been applied in any legitimate sense to
inhabited areas was firmly repudiated by the International Court of Justice (“World
Court”) in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara , 1975 I.C.J. 12, 35.  For analysis,
see Questions Concerning Western Sahara:  Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice, 16 October 1975 , 10 INT’L LAW. 199, 199-203 (1976) (prepared by
the Registry of the International Court of Justice); see also Sovereignty Over Unoc-
cupied Territories:  The Western Sahara Decision , 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 135
(1977).
43 See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN POLICY, 1783-
1812 (1967).
44 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  For background, see NORGREN, supra  note 5, at
92-95; see also DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT:  THE MAKING OF JUSTICE 27-35 (1997).
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he readily conceded that title to the territories they occupied was
vested in indigenous peoples, Marshall denied that this afforded
them supremacy within their respective domains.45  Rather, he
argued, the self-assigned authority of discoverers to constrain
alienation of discovered lands implied that prepotency inhered in
the discovering power, not only with respect to other potential
buyers but vis-à-vis the native owners themselves.46
Since the sovereignty of discoverers—or derivatives like the
U.S.—could in this sense be said to overarch that of those discov-
ered, Marshall held that discovery also conveyed to the discov-
erer an “absolute title” or “eminent domain” underlying the
aboriginal title possessed by indigenous peoples.47  The native
“right of possession” was thereby reduced at the stroke of a pen
to something enjoyed at the “sufferance” of the discovering (su-
perior) sovereign.48
[The] principle was, that discovery gave title to the govern-
ment by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.  The exclusion of all other
Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discov-
ery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and
establishing settlements upon it.49 . . . In the establishment of
these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in
no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a
considerable extent, impaired. . . . [T]heir rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily dimin-
ished, and their power to dispose of the soil, at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fun-
damental principle, that discovery gave exclusive right to those
45 Johnson , 21 U.S. at 574.
46
The United States . . . maintain[s], as all others have maintained, that dis-
covery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy,
either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of
sovereignty as the circumstances of [the U.S. itself] allow [it] to exercise.
Id.  at 587.
47 Id.  at 588.
48 “It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing.  Their
right of possession has never been questioned.  The claim of government extends
[however] to the complete ultimate [or absolute] title.” Id.  at 603.
An absolute [title] must be an exclusive title, . . . a title which excludes all
others not compatible with it.  All our institutions recognize the absolute
title of the crown [now held by the U.S.], subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy, [a matter] incompatible with an absolute and complete title in
the Indians.
Id.  at 588.
49 Id.  at 573.
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who made it. . . .50
“[T]he Indian inhabitants are [thus] to be considered merely as
occupants. . . .”51  However extravagant [my logic] may appear,”
Marshall summed up, “if the principle has been asserted in the
first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been ac-
quired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the
community originates in it, . . . it cannot be questioned.”52  In
other words, violations of law themselves become law if commit-
ted by those wielding enough power to get away with them.  For
all the elegant sophistry embodied in its articulation, then, the
Johnson v. McIntosh  opinion reduces to the gutter cliché that
“might makes right.”  In this manner, Marshall not only inte-
grated “the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and coloni-
alism directed against non-Western peoples” into the canon of
American law, but did so with a virulence unrivaled even by Eu-
ropean jurists upon whose precedents he professed to base his
own.53
There were of course loose ends to be tied up, and these Mar-
shall addressed through opinions rendered in the “Cherokee
Cases.”54  In his Cherokee Nation  opinion, the Chief Justice un-
dertook to resolve questions concerning the precise standing to
be accorded indigenous peoples.  Since the U.S. had entered into
numerous treaties with them, it was bound by both customary
international law and Article 1 § 10 of its own constitution to
treat them as coequal sovereigns.  Marshall’s verbiage in Johnson
had plainly cast them in a very different light.  Hence, in Chero-
kee Nation , he conjured a whole new classification of politicole-
gal entity “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which
exist no where else.”55
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside
within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
50 Id.  at 574.
51 Id.  at 591.
52 Id.  at 591.  For further analyses, see Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Ab-
original Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States , 27 BUF. L. REV. 637
(1978); see also  David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. McIntosh Revisited:  Through the Eyes
of Mitchell v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV., 159 (1994); Robert A. Wil-
liams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:  The Hard Trail of Decolonizing the
White Man’s Jurisprudence , 31 WIS. L. REV., 219 (1986).
53 Williams, supra  note 9, at 317.
54 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worchester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See generally NORGREN, supra  note 5, at 98-111, 114-22.
55 Cherokee Nation , 30 U.S. at 16.
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with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.  They
may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic de-
pendent nations .  They occupy a territory to which we assert a
title independent of their will . . . . Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.56
“The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the
United States,” he continued.57  “In all our maps, geographical
treatises, histories, and laws, it is so considered. . . . [T]hey are
[therefore] considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the
United States . . . [and] acknowledge themselves [to be] under
the protection of the United States.”58  What Marshall had de-
scribed was a status virtually identical to that of a protectorate,
yet as he himself would observe in Worcester  a year later:
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker
power does not surrender its independence—its right to self-
government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its pro-
tection.  A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may
place itself under the protection of one more powerful, with-
out stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to
be a state.59
It follows that a protectorate would also retain its land rights,
unimpaired by its relationship with a stronger country.60
At another level, the Chief Justice was describing a status simi-
lar to that of the states of the union (i.e., subordinate to federal
authority, while retaining a residue of sovereign prerogative).
Yet he, better than most, was aware that if this were so, the fed-
eral government would never have had a basis in either interna-
tional or constitutional law to enter into treaties with indigenous
peoples in the first place, a matter which would have invalidated
any U.S. claim to land titles accruing therefrom.  Small wonder,
trapped as he was in the welter of his own contradictions, that
Marshall eventually threw up his hands in frustration, unable or
unwilling to further define Indians as either fish or fowl.  In the
end, he simply repeated his assertion that the U.S./Indian rela-
tionship was unique “perhaps unlike that of any two people in
56 Id.  at 17 [emphasis added].
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Worcester , 31 U.S. at 561.
60 There are numerous examples of this being so. See  Vine Deloria, Jr., The Size
and Status of Nations , in NATIVE AMERICAN VOICES:  A READER 457 (Susan Lobo
& Steve Talbot eds., 1998).
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existence.”61
Small wonder, too, all things considered, that the Chief Jus-
tice’s Cherokee Nation  opinion was joined by only one other
member of the high court.62  The majority took exception, with
Justices Henry Baldwin and William Johnson writing separate
opinions,63 and Justice Smith Thompson, together with Justice
Joseph Story, entering a strongly-worded dissent which laid bare
the only reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the facts (both
legal and historical).64
In Justice Thompson’s opinion:
[I]t is [the Indians’] political condition that constitutes their
foreign  character, and in that sense must the term foreign  be
understood, as used in the constitution.  It can have no rela-
tion to local, geographical, or territorial position.  It cannot
mean a country beyond [the] sea.  Mexico or Canada is cer-
tainly to be considered a foreign country, in reference to the
United States.  It is the political relation in which one . . .
country stands to another, which constitutes it [as] foreign to
the other.65
Nonetheless, Marshall’s views prevailed, a circumstance al-
lowing him to deploy his “domestic dependent nation” thesis
against both the Cherokees and  Georgia in Worcester .66  First, he
reserved on constitutional grounds relations with all “other na-
tions” to the federal realm, thereby dispensing with Georgia’s
contention that it possessed a “state’s right” to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a portion of the Cherokee Nation falling within its
boundaries.67  Turning to the Cherokees, he reiterated his pre-
mise that they—and by implication all Indians within whatever
borders the U.S. might eventually claim—occupied a nebulous
quasi-sovereign status as “distinct [independent] political com-
munities” subject to federal authority.68  In practical effect, Mar-
shall cast indigenous nations as entities inherently imbued with a
sufficient measure of sovereignty to alienate their territory by
61 Cherokee Nation , 30 U.S. at 16.
62 Joining Justice Marshall was Justice John McLean. NORGREN, supra  note 5, at
100.
63 Id.  at 106-07.
64 Thompson wrote the dissent, and Justice Story endorsed it.  Joseph C. Burke,
The Cherokee Cases:  A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality , 21 STAN. L. REV., 500,
516-18 (1969).
65 Cherokee Nation , 30 U.S. at 54-55 [emphasis added].
66 NORGREN, supra  note 5, at 117, 120-21.
67 See  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54 (1832).
68 Id.  at 557, 559.
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treaty when and wherever the U.S. desired they do so, but never
with enough to refuse.69
As legal scholars Vine Deloria, Jr. and David E. Wilkins have
recently observed, the cumulative distortions of both established
law and historical reality bound up in Marshall’s “Indian opin-
ions” created a very steep and slippery slope, with no bottom
anywhere in sight.
[T]he original assumption [was] that the federal government is
authorized and empowered to protect the Indians in the enjoy-
ment of their lands.  Once it is implied that this power also
involves the ability of the federal government by itself to force
a purchase of the lands, there is no way the implied power can
be limited.  If the government can force the disposal of lands,
why can it not determine how the lands are to be used?  And if
it can determine how the lands are to be used, why can it not
tell the Indians how to live?  And if it can tell Indians how to
live, why can it not tell them how to behave and what to
believe?70
By the end of the nineteenth century, less than seventy years
after Cherokee Nation  and Worcester , each of these things had
happened.  Within such territory as was by then reserved for in-
digenous use and occupancy, the traditional mode of collective
land tenure had been supplanted by federal imposition of a
“more civilized” form of individual title expressly intended to
compel agricultural land usage.71  Native spiritual practices had
been prohibited under penalty of law,72 and entire generations of
American Indian youngsters were being shipped off, often forci-
bly, to boarding schools where they were held for years on end,
forbidden knowledge of their own languages and cultures while
they were systematically indoctrinated with Christian beliefs and
69 “Indian tribes are still recognized as sovereigns by the United States, but they
are deprived of the one power all sovereigns must have in order to function effec-
tively—the power to say ‘no’ to other sovereigns.” VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E.
WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 70 (1999).
70 Id.  at 29.
71 This was carried out under provision of the 1887 Indian General Allotment Act
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388-391 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (repealed 2000).
For historical overviews, see JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934 (1991).  For legal background, see SIDNEY L. HAR-
RING, CROW DOG’S CASE:  AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 142-74 (1994).
72 “The sun-dance, and all other similar dances and so-called religious ceremonies
are considered ‘Indian Offenses’ under existing regulations, and corrective penalties
are provided.” U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, Circular 1665  (Apr.
26, 1921).
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cultural values.73  The overall policy of “assimilation,” under
which these measures were implemented, readily conforms to the
contemporary legal definition of cultural genocide.74
Meanwhile, American Indians had been reduced to utter desti-
tution, dispossessed of approximately 97.5% of our original land
holdings,75 our remaining assets held in a perpetual and self-as-
signed “trust” by federal authorities wielding what Marshall’s
heirs on the Supreme Court described as an extra-constitutional
or “plenary”—that is, unlimited, absolute, and judicially unchal-
lengeable—power over our affairs.76  Suffice it here to observe
that nothing in the Doctrine of Discovery empowered any coun-
try to impose itself on others in this way.  On the contrary, the
“juridical reasoning” evident in the Marshall opinions and their
successors has much in common with, and in many respects
prefigured, the new body of law—repudiated first by an Interna-
tional Court of Arbitration opinion in the 1928 Island of Palmas
case,77 then more sweepingly in the 1945 United Nations Char-
73 See generally DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION:  AMER-
ICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928 (1995).
74 Article II(c) of the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide outlaws as genocidal any policy leading to the “physical destruc-
tion . . . in whole or in part, [of] a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such.”  Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature  Dec. 9, 1948, art. II(c), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951).  Article II(e) specifically prohibits any policy devolving upon the forced
transfer of children. Id.  at art. II(e).
75 For details, see CHARLES C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 18TH ANNUAL REPORT, 1896-97 (1899).
76 The implications of the term, first employed by the Marshall Court in Gibbons
v. Ogden , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), were set forth more fully in U.S. v. Kagama ,
118 U.S. 375 (1886), and finalized in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock , 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
In the latter case, Justice Edward D. White opined that “Congress possesse[s] full
power [over Indian affairs, and] the judiciary cannot question or inquire into [its]
motives. . . . If injury [is] occasioned . . . by the use made by Congress of its power,
relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to the courts.”
Lone Wolf , 187 U.S. at 568.  By 1942, the courts were even more blunt, stating that
Congress wielded “full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, [and] unqualified” power
over indigenous nations within its borders.  Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134
P.2d 976, 979 (1942).  For background, see Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward
Consent and Cooperation:  Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations , 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 507 (1987); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indi-
ans:  Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations , 132 U. PA. L. REV. (1984); David E. Wil-
kins, The Supreme Court’s Explication of ‘Federal Plenary Power’:  An Analysis of
Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886-1914 , 18 AM. INDIAN Q. 349 (1994).
77 A territorial title deriving from discovery cannot prevail over a title based in a
prior and continuing display of sovereignty. See  Philip C. Jessup, The Palmas Island
Arbitration , 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 735 (1928) (reporting the Island of Palmas  case
(United States v. Netherlands, Permanent Ct. Arb., Hague, 1928)).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 18 30-SEP-03 8:55
680 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81, 2002]
ter78 and the U.N.’s 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and People79—purported to




Although they are usually treated as an entirely separate con-
sideration, conquest rights in the New World accrued under the
law of nations as a subpart of the discovery doctrine. Under in-
ternational law, discoverers could acquire land only through a
voluntary alienation of title by native owners, with one excep-
tion—when they were compelled to wage a “Just War” against
native people—by which those holding discovery rights might
seize land and other property through military force.81  The U.S.
clearly acknowledged that this was so in the earlier mentioned
Northwest Ordinance, where it pledged that indigenous nations
would “never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress.”82
The criteria for a Just War were defined quite narrowly in in-
ternational law.  As early as 1539, Vitoria and, to a lesser degree,
Matı́as de Paz asserted that there were only three:  the natives
had either to have refused to admit Christian missionaries among
them, to have arbitrarily refused to engage in commerce with the
discovering power, or to have mounted some unprovoked physi-
cal assault against its representatives/subjects.83  Absent at least
78 U.N. CHARTER Ch. XI, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 993.
79 For the full text of the Declaration, see G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
80 See generally MARK FRANK LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT
OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A TREATISE ON THE LAW
AND PRACTICE RELATED TO COLONIAL EXPANSION (1926); ALPHEUS HENRY
SNOW, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NATIONS
(Metro Books 1972) (1919).  On the material process leading to repudiation, see
FRANZ ANSPRENGER, THE DISSOLUTION OF COLONIAL EMPIRES (1981); STEWART
C. EASTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF WESTERN COLONIALISM:  A HISTORICAL SUR-
VEY FROM THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT (1964).
81 For a broad exploration of the concept, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UN-
JUST WARS:  A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977).
82 Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, available at  http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/nworder.htm (last modified Jan. 31, 2002); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 10 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1975).
83 Franciscus de Vitoria, De Indis Recenter Inventis , in DE INDIS ET DE JURE
BELLI REFLECTIONES 151 (1917); Silvio Zavala, Los Doctrinas de Palacios Rubios y
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one of these conditions, any war waged by a European state or
its derivative would be “unjust”—the term was changed to “ag-
gressive” during the twentieth century—and resulting claims to
title unlawful.84  One searches in vain for an example in Ameri-
can history where any of the criteria were realized.
A more pragmatic problem confronting those claiming that the
U.S. holds conquest rights to native lands is that, while the fed-
eral government recognizes the existence of approximately 400
indigenous peoples within its borders, its own count of the num-
ber of “Indian Wars” it has fought “number [about] 40.”85
Plainly, the United States cannot exercise “conquest rights” over
the more than 300 nations against which, by its own admission, it
has never fought a war.  Yet, as is readily evident in its 1955 Tee-
Hit-Ton  opinion,86 the Supreme Court, mere facts to the contrary
notwithstanding, has anchored U.S. land title in a pretense in
which exactly the opposite is true.
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of
this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force
and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by
treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a
sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their
land.87
Particularly in his Johnson  opinion, but also in Cherokee Na-
tion , John Marshall sought to transcend this issue by treating dis-
Matı́as de Paz ante la Conquista America , in MEMORIA DE EL COLEGIO NACIONAl
(1950).  For background, see WILLIAMS, supra  note 9, at 85-108.
84 SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST:  THE ACQUISITION OF TERRI-
TORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 52-56 (1996); MATTHEW
M. MCMAHON, CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THE LEGAL LIMI-
TATIONS ON THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY CONQUEST 35 (1940).
85 On the present disposition of “federally recognized tribes,” see FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, ATLAS OF AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS (1990).  For the official count of
“Indian Wars,” see U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, REPORT
ON INDIANS TAXED AND NOT TAXED 1890 637-38 (1894).  For details on the wars
themselves, see ALAN AXELROD, CHRONICLE OF THE INDIAN WARS FROM COLO-
NIAL TIMES TO WOUNDED KNEE (1993).
86 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 273 (1955).
87 Id.  at 291.
The Alaska natives [who had pressed a land claim in Tee-Hit-Ton] had
never fought a skirmish with Russia [which claimed their territories before
the U.S.] or the United States . . . . To say that the Alaska natives were
subjugated by conquest stretches the imagination too far.  The only sover-
eign act that can be said to have conquered the Alaska native was the Tee-
Hit-Ton  opinion itself.
Newton, supra  note 15, at 1244.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 20 30-SEP-03 8:55
682 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81, 2002]
covery and conquest as if they were synonymous, a conflation
evidencing even less legal merit than the flights of fancy dis-
cussed in the preceding section.  In fact, the high court was ulti-
mately forced to distinguish between the two, acknowledging
that the “English possessions in America were not claimed by
right of conquest, but by right of discovery,”88 and, resultingly,
that the “law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general,
the relations between the conqueror and conquered, [is] incapa-
ble of application” by the U.S. to American Indians.89
A further complication is that as early as 1672, legal philoso-
phers like Samuel Pufendorf had mounted a serious challenge to
the idea that even such territory as was seized in the course of a
Just War might be permanently retained.90  Although Hugo Gro-
tius, Emmerich de Vattel, William Edward Hall, John Westlake
and other such theorists continued to aver the validity of con-
quest rights through the end of the nineteenth century,91 a view
very similar to Pufendorf’s had proven ascendant by the 1920s.
Oddly, given its stance concerning American Indians, as well
as its then-recent forcible acquisitions of overseas colonies like
Hawai‘i, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines,92 the U.S. assumed a
leading role in this respect.  Although the Senate refused to allow
the country to join, President Woodrow Wilson was instrumental
in creating the League of Nations, an organization intended “to
substitute diplomacy for war in the resolution of international
disputes.”93  In some ways more important was its centrality in
88 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 1409 (1842).
89 Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823).
90 See generally SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE
UNIVERSALIS LIBRI DUO (William Abbott Oldfather trans., 1931) (1672); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS JUXTA LEGEM NATURALE LIBRI DUO
(Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1927) (1682); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE
NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934)
(1688).
91 See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty ed., 1883)
(1758); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (James Brown Scott
ed., 1925) (1625); WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNA-TIONAL LAW
(1904).
92 See generally NOEL J. KENT, HAWAII:  ISLANDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE (2d ed.
1993); STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, “BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION”:  THE AMERI-
CAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 (1982); JULIUS W. PRATT, THE EX-
PANSIONISTS OF 1898:  THE ACQUISITION OF HAWAII AND THE SPANISH ISLANDS
(1936).
93 On Wilson’s role and Senate obstruction, see FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE,
FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER: THE LEGALIST APPROACH TO INTERNA-TIONAL
RELATIONS, 1898-1922 47-48, 53-54 (1999).
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crafting the 1928 General Treaty on the Renunciation of War,
also known as the “Kellogg-Briand Pact” or “Pact of Paris.”94
With the [treaty], almost all the powers of the world, including
all the Great Powers, renounced the right to resort to war as
an instrument of state policy.  By Article 1, “[t]he High Con-
tracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respec-
tive peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one an-
other.”  By Article 2, the Parties “agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them,
shall never be sought except by pacific means.”95
In 1932, Secretary of State Henry Stimson followed up by an-
nouncing that the U.S. would no longer recognize title to terri-
tory seized by armed force.96  This new dictum of international
law, shortly to be referred to as the “Stimson Doctrine of Non-
Recognition,”97 was expressly designed to “effectively bar the le-
gality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by
pressure or treaty violation, and . . . [to] lead to the restoration to
[vanquished nations] of rights and titles of which [they] have
been unjustly deprived.”98  Within a year, the doctrine’s blanket
rejection of conquest rights had been more formally articulated
in a League of Nations Resolution and legally codified in the
Chaco Declaration, the Saaverda Lamas Pact, and the Monte-
video Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.99  In 1936,
the Inter-American Conference on the Maintenance of Peace
also declared a “proscription of territorial conquest, and that, in
consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be rec-
94 See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
(1963); Lothar Kotzsch, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1956).
95 KORMAN, supra  note 84, at 192.
96 For Stimson’s statement, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS 262 (John W. Wheeler-Bennett ed., 1932).  For discussion, see
ROBERT LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRITORY:  THE STIMSON DOCTRINE AND RE-
LATED PRINCIPLES IN LEGAL THEORY AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1947).
97 KORMAN, supra  note 84, at 238-39. See also LANGER, supra  note 96.
98 KORMAN, supra  note 84, at 239 (quoting letter from Secretary of State Henry
Stimson to Senator W.E. Borah (Feb. 23, 1932)).
99 League Assembly Resolution (Mar. 11, 1932); Chaco Declaration (Aug. 3,
1932); Saaverda Lamas Pact (Oct. 10, 1933); Montevideo Convention (Dec. 26,
1933). See generally KORMAN, supra  note 84, at 240-41.
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ognized.”100  The principle was again proclaimed in the Declara-
tion on the Non-Recognition of the Acquisition of Territory by
Force advanced by the Eighth Pan-American Conference in
1938.
[A]s a fundamental of the Public Law of America . . . the occu-
pation or acquisition of territory or any other modification or
territorial or boundary arrangement obtained through con-
quest by force or non-pacifistic means shall not be valid or
have legal effect. . . .
The pledge of non-recognition of situations arising from the
foregoing conditions is an obligation which cannot be avoided
either unilaterally or collectively.101
By the time the Supreme Court penned its bellicose opinion in
Tee-Hit-Ton , the Stimson Doctrine had already served as a cor-
nerstone in formulating the charges of planning and waging ag-
gressive war pressed against the major nazi102 defendants at
Nuremberg and the Japanese in Tokyo (tribunals instigated and
organized mainly by the U.S.).103  It had also served as a guiding
principle in the (again, effectively U.S. instigated) establishment
of both the Organization of American States and the United Na-
tions, entities which in their very charters, like the ill-fated
League of Nations before them, are devoted to “the progressive
codification of [international] law . . . for purposes of preventing
war.”104  Correspondingly, Stimson’s “new dictum” found its
most refined and affirmative expression in the charters’ provisos,
reiterated almost as boilerplate in a host of subsequent U.N. res-
olutions, declarations, and conventions, concerning the “equal
rights and self-determination of all peoples.”105
100 LANGER, supra  note 96, at 78 (quoting Declaration of Principles of Inter-
American Solidarity and Cooperation, Dec. 21, 1936).
101 KORMAN, supra  note 84, at 241-42 (quoting Declaration on Non-Recognition
of the Acquisition of Territory by Force, 34 AM. J. INT’L. L. 193 (1940)).  In its 1945
Act of Chapultepec, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace
not only asserted non-recognition of conquest rights as customary law but declared
that the principle of “non-recognition had been incorporated into the [black letter]
international law of American States since 1890.” Id.
102 Deviation from standard capitalization due to author’s preference.
103 ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG:  THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987); BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NU-
REMBERG (1981).
104 On the U.S. role in founding the United Nations, see PHYLLIS BENNIS, CALL-
ING THE SHOTS:  HOW WASHINGTON DOMINATES TODAY’S UN 1-13 (2d ed. 2000).
On the OAS, see BOYLE, supra  note 93, at 119-22.  On the League, see 1 F.P. WAL-
TERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952).
105 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
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Contradictory as the Tee-Hit-Ton  court’s blatant conquest
rhetoric was to the lofty posturing of the U.S. in the international
arena, it was even more so with respect to a related subterfuge
unfolding on the home front.  By 1945, the United States was
urgently seeking a means of distinguishing its own record of terri-
torial expansion from that of the nazis it was preparing to hang
for having undertaken very much the same course of action.106
The workhorse employed in this effort was the so-called Indian
Claims Commission (ICC), established to make retroactive pay-
ment to indigenous peoples whose property had been “unlaw-
fully taken” over the years.107  The purpose of the Commission
was, as President Harry Truman explained upon signing the ena-
bling legislation on August 14, 1946, to foster an impression that
the U.S. had acquired none  of its land base by conquest.
This bill makes perfectly clear what many men and women,
here and abroad, have failed to recognize, that in our transac-
ples, supra  note 79, at ¶ 2.  As stated in Article 1(1) and (2) of the U.N. CHARTER,
“The Purposes of the United Nations are [t]o maintain international peace and se-
curity . . . [by] adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace,” mainly by developing “friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples.” U.N. CHARTER, supra  note 78.  Elsewhere, it is simply stated that
“[A]ll peoples have the right of self-determination.” See , e.g. , International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 1(1) U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights , G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp.
No. 16, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  Article 1 of the OAS Charter, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (1948), declares the organization to be “a regional agency”
subject to provisions of the U.N. Charter.  Article 3(a) declares the elements of law
promulgated by the U.N. to be binding upon all OAS member states. Id.
106 Hitler, for one, was quite clear that the nazi “lebensraumpolitik” was based,
theoretically, practically and quite directly, on the preexisting model embodied in
the U.S. realization of its “manifest destiny” vis-à-vis American Indians and other
racial/cultural “inferiors.” ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 403, 591 (John Chamber-
lain et al. eds., 1939) (1925); HITLER’S SECRET BOOK 46-52 (Salvatore Attanasio
trans. 1961).  Another iteration will be found in a memorandum prepared by an
aide, Col. Friedrich Hössbach, summarizing Hitler’s statements during a high-level
“Führer Conference” conducted shortly before Germany’s 1939 invasion of Poland.
25 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR NAZI WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MIL-
ITARY TRIBUNAL 402-13 (1947).  The relationship between nazi and U.S. theory/
practice is closely examined in Frank Parella, Lebensraum and Manifest Destiny:  A
Comparative Study in the Justification of Expansionism (1950) (unpublished M.A.
Thesis, Georgetown University, available at  http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/ aiq/24.3fried-
berg.html). See also NORMAN RICH, HITLER’S WAR AIMS:  IDEOLOGY, THE NAZI
STATE, AND THE COURSE OF EXPANSION 8 (1973); JOHN TOLAND, ADOLF HITLER
802 (1976).
107 For the most detailed overview of the ICC, see HARVEY D. ROSENTHAL,
THEIR DAY IN COURT:  A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990).
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tions with the Indian tribes we have . . . set for ourselves the
standard of fair and honorable dealings, pledging respect for
all Indian property rights.  Instead of confiscating Indian
lands, we have purchased from the tribes that once owned this
continent more than 90 percent of our public domain. . . .108
The game was rigged from the outset, to be sure, since the ICC
was not empowered to return land to native people even in cases
where its review of the manner in which the U.S. had acquired it
revealed the grossest sorts of illegality.  The terms of compensa-
tory awards, moreover, were restricted to payment of the esti-
mated value of the land at the time it was taken—often a century
or more before—without such considerations as interest accrual
or appreciation in land values during the intervening period.109
Still, despite its self-serving and mostly cosmetic nature, the very
existence of the ICC demonstrated quite clearly that, in terms of
legality, U.S. assertion of title to/jurisdiction over Indian Country
can no more be viewed as based in “conquest rights” than in
“rights of discovery.”  All U.S. pretensions to ownership of prop-
erty in North America must therefore be seen as treaty-based.
IV
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE LAW
When Congress established the ICC in 1946, it expected within
five years to “resolve” all remaining land rights issues concerning
American Indians.110  The Commission was to identify and cata-
logue the basis in treaties, agreements and statutes by which the
U.S. had assumed lawful ownership of every disputed land parcel
within its purported domain, awarding “just compensation” in
each case where the propriety of the transaction(s) documented
might otherwise be deemed inadequate.111  By 1951, however,
108 Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Creating the Indian Claims
Commission (Aug. 13, 1946), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES:  HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1946 414 (1962).
109 All the ICC accomplished was to “clear out the underbrush” obscuring an ac-
curate view of who actually owns what in North America. DELORIA, supra  note 1,
at 227. See also  Ward Churchill, Charades Anyone?  The Indian Claims Commission
in Context , 24 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 43 (2000).
110 Hearings on H.R. 1198 and 1341 to Create an Indian Claims Commission
Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs , 79th Cong. 81-84 (1945).
111 See  Thomas LeDuc, The Work of the Indian Claims Commission Under the Act
of 1946 , 26 PAC. HISTORICAL REV. 1 (1957); John T. Vance, The Congressional Man-
date and the Indian Claims Commission , 45 N.D. L. REV. 325 (1969); Wilcomb E.
Washburn, Land Claims in the Mainstream of Indian/White Relations, in  IRREDEEM-
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the 200-odd claims originally anticipated had swelled to 852.112
The lifespan of the ICC was extended for another five years, then
another, a process which was repeated until the “third genera-
tion” of commissioners finally gave up in exhaustion.113
By the time the Commission suspended operations on Septem-
ber 30, 1978, it had processed 547 of the 615 dockets into which
the 852 claims had been consolidated, none in a manner satisfac-
tory to the native claimants (nearly half were simply dis-
missed).114  Title to virtually the entire state of California, for
instance, was supposedly “quieted” in the “Pit River Land
Claims Settlement” of the mid-1960s by an award amounting to
forty-seven cents per acre, despite the fact that the treaties by
which the territory had ostensibly been ceded to the U.S. had
never been ratified by the Senate.115
Most importantly, in its final report the ICC acknowledged
that after three decades of concerted effort, it had been unable to
discern a legal basis for U.S. title to what the federal Public
Lands Law Review Commission had already described as “one
third of the nation’s land.”116  The fact is that about half the area
of the country was purchased by treaty or agreement at an aver-
age price of less than a dollar per acre; another third of a [billion]
acres, mainly in the West, was confiscated without compensation;
another two-thirds of a [billion] acres was “claimed by the
United States without . . . pretense of [even] a unilateral action
extinguishing native title.”117
There can be no serious question of the right of indigenous
ABLE AMERICA:  THE INDIANS’ ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 21 (Imre Sutton ed.,
1985).
112 Hearings on the Independent Office Appropriations for 1952 Before the House
Subcomm. of the Comm. of Appropriations , 82d Cong. 28-37 (1951).
113 Amending the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 as Amended Before the
House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs , 92d Cong. (1972).
114 The remaining sixty-eight dockets were turned over to the U.S. Court of
Claims.  Russel Barsh, Behind Land Claims:  Rationalizing Dispossession in Anglo-
American Law , 1 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY  15 (1986).
115 Howard Friedman, Interest on Indian Land Claims:  Judicial Protection of the
Fisc , 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 26 (1970); Robert F. Heizer & Alfred L. Kroeber, For Sale:
California at 47¢ Per Acre , 3 J. CAL. ANTHROPOLOGY 38 (1976); M. Annette Jaimes,
The Pit River Indian Land Claim Dispute in Northern California , 4 J. ETHNIC STUD-
IES 47 (1987).
116 U.S. INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (1978); PUB. LAND LAW
REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND (1970).
117 Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States , 58
N.D. L. REV. 7, 7 (1982).
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nations to recover property to which their title remains un-
clouded, or that their right to recover lands seized without pay-
ment equals or exceeds that of the United States to preserve its
“territorial integrity” by way of paltry and greatly-belated com-
pensatory awards.118  Restitution rather than compensation is, af-
ter all, the guiding principle of the tort provisions embodied in
international public law.119  Nor is this the end of it.  Within the
area ostensibly acquired by the U.S. through treaties or agree-
ments, many of the instruments of cession are known to have
been fraudulent or coerced.  These must be considered invalid
under Articles 48-53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.120
A classic illustration of a fraud involves the 1861 Treaty of Fort
Wise, in which not only did federal commissioners forge the sig-
natures of selected native leaders—several of whom were not
even present during the “negotiations”—but the Senate altered
many of the treaty’s terms and provisions after  it was supposedly
signed, then ratified the result without so much as informing the
Indians of the changes.121  On this basis, the U.S. claimed to have
obtained the “consent” of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes to its
acquisition of the eastern half of what is now the State of Colo-
118 The territorial integrity of all member states is guaranteed in Chapter I, Article
2(4) of the U.N. CHARTER, supra  note 78.  The guarantee presupposes, however,
that there was a degree of basic legal  integrity involved in the territorial acquisitions
by which member states composed themselves in the first place.  In cases where this
is not so, the rights to self-determination of involuntarily subordinated or usurped
peoples always  outweighs the right to preserve territorial integrity. See LEE C.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION:  THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); Ved
Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law:  Validity of Claims to Secede ,
13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 257 (1981).
119 On international torts, see Eduardo Jiminez de Arechaga, International Re-
sponsibility , in MANUAL OF PUB. INT’L L. 564 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968).
120 SINCLAIR, supra  note 3, at 14-18.  Treaty fraud, which is specifically prohibited
under Article 49 of the Convention as a matter of jus cogens , has been defined by
the International Law Commission (ILC) as including “any false statements, misrep-
resentations or other deceitful proceedings by which a State may be induced to give
a consent to a treaty which it would not otherwise have given.” Id.  at 173-74.  Coer-
cion, which is prohibited under Articles 51-52, also as a matter of jus cogens , in-
volves “acts or threats” directed by one nation involved in a treaty negotiation
against another (or its representative[s]). Id.  at 176-81.  The ILC has concluded that
“the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force is a principle
which is lex lata  in . . . international law,” and that the nullity of treaties invalidated
on this basis is absolute. Id.  at 177 (quoting Y.B. OF THE INT’L LAW COMM’N 246
(1966)).
121 See STAN HOIG, THE SAND CREEK MASSACRE 13-17 (1961).
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rado.122  Comparable examples abound (e.g., the above-men-
tioned California treaties).
Examples of coercion are also legion, but none provides a bet-
ter illustration than does the 1876-77 proceeding in which federal
authorities suspended distribution of rations to the Lakotas, who
at the time were directly subjugated by and therefore dependent
upon the U.S. military for sustenance, and informed them that
they would not be fed again until their leaders had signed an
agreement relinquishing title to the Black Hills region of present-
day South Dakota.123  Thus did the Congress contend that the
1851 and 1868 treaties of Fort Laramie, in each of which the
Black Hills were recognized as an integral part of the Lakota
homeland, had been “superseded” and U.S. ownership of the
area secured.124
Without doubt, North America’s indigenous nations are no
less entitled to recover lands expropriated through such traves-
ties than they are the territories already discussed.  Although it is
currently impossible to offer a precise estimate regarding the ex-
tent of the acreage involved—to do so would require a contex-
tual review of each U.S./Indian treaty, and a parcel-by-parcel
delineation of the title transfers accruing from invalid instru-
ments—it is safe to suggest that adding it to the approximately
thirty-five percent of the continental U.S. which was never ceded
would place something well over half the present gross “domes-
tic” territoriality of the United States at issue.125
The U.S., of course, holds the power to simply ignore the law
in inconvenient connections such as these.  Doing so, however,
122 Treaty with the Arapaho and Cheyenne, 1861, February 15, 1861, 12 Stat. 1163,
reprinted in KAPPLER, supra  note 1, at 807.
123 Treaty with the Sioux—Brulé, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa,
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee—and Arapaho, 1868 15 Stat.
635, reprinted in  Kappler, supra  note 1, at 998.  On the “negotiation” process at
issue, see EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE:  THE SIOUX NATION
VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 71-95 (1991). See also The
Earth Is Our Mother:  Struggles for Indian Land and Liberation in the Contemporary
United States , in FROM A NATIVE SON: SELECTED ESSAYS IN INDIGENISM, 1985-
1995, at 37 (Ward Churchill ed., 1996).
124 U.S. title was formally asserted in an Act (19 Stat. 254) passed by Congress on
Feb. 28, 1877.  It should be noted that while the express consent of three-quarters of
all adult male Lakotas was required under Article 12 of the 1868 treaty for any
future land alienations by that people to be legal, the signatures of barely fifteen
percent were obtained on the Black Hills cession agreement.
125 See WARD CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND:  NATIVE NORTH AMERI-
CAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 10 (2d ed. 1999).
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will never serve in itself to legitimate its comportment. Instead,
its continued possession of a vast expanse of illegally-occupied
territory126—an internal colonial empire, as it were127—only des-
tines it to remain what it was at its inception:  an inherently crim-
inal or “rogue” state.128  It is through this lens that U.S.
pronouncements and performance from Nuremberg to Vietnam
must inevitably be evaluated.129  So, too, President George Her-
bert Walker Bush’s 1990 rhetoric concerning America’s moral/
legal obligation to kill more than a million Iraqis while militarily
revoking their government’s forcible annexation of neighboring
Kuwait.130
On the face of it, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is
that the unsavory stew of racial/cultural arrogance, duplicity and
abiding legal cynicism defining U.S. relations with indigenous na-
tions from the outset has come long since to permeate America’s
relationship to most other countries.  How else to understand
Bush’s 1991 declaration that the display of U.S. military might
he’d ordered in Iraq was intended more than anything else to put
the entire world on notice that, henceforth, “what we  say,
126 For a related development of the thesis, see RODOLFO ACUÑA, OCCUPIED
AMERICA:  THE CHICANO’S STRUGGLE TOWARD LIBERATION (1972).
127 See  Robert K. Thomas, Colonialism:  Classic and Internal , 4 New Univ.
Thought 44 (1966-67), reprinted in THE WAY:  AN ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN IN-
DIAN LITERATURE 60 (Shirley Hill Witt & Stanley Steiner eds., 1972); Ward Churc-
hill, Indigenous Peoples of the United States:  A Struggle Against Internal
Colonialism , 16 BLACK SCHOLAR 29 (1985); LEAH RENAE KELLY, The Open Veins
of Native North America:  A Question of Internal Colonialism , in IN MY OWN
VOICE:  EXPLORATIONS IN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF ART AND CINEMA 112
(Ward Churchill ed., 2001).
128 See BLUM, supra  note 8; see also NOAM CHOMSKY, ROGUE STATES:  THE
RULE OF FORCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (2000).
129 As Justice Robert H. Jackson put it while serving as lead U.S. prosecutor at
Nuremberg, “[w]e are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against
others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.” BERTRAND RUS-
SELL, WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM 125 (1967); see also  Robert H. Jackson, Opening
Statement for the United States before the International Military Tribunal, November
21, 1945 , in FROM NUREMBERG TO MY LAI 28 (Jay W. Baird, ed., 1972).  As con-
cerns U.S. replication of the major offenses of which the nazis were convicted, see
Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation , in THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (Richard Falk ed., 1968); RALPH STAVINS ET AL., WASH-
INGTON PLANS AN AGGRESSIVE WAR (1971).
130 On the human toll ultimately extracted by the U.S. in its “roll back” of Iraq’s
“naked aggression”—which had, at most, resulted in the deaths of “several hun-
dred” Kuwaitis—see RAMSEY CLARK, ET AL., WAR CRIMES:  A REPORT ON UNITED
STATES WAR CRIMES AGAINST IRAQ (1992); International Action Center, Challenge
to Genocide:  Let Iraq Live  (1998); U.N. Food & Agric. Org. & Ramsey Clark, The
Impact of Sanctions on Iraq:  The Children are Dying  (1996).
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goes”?131  In what other manner might we explain the fact that
while Bush claimed the “New World Order” he was inaugurating
would be marked by nothing so much as “the rule of law among
nations,”132 the United States was and remains unique in the con-
sistency with which it has rejected both the authority of interna-
tional courts and any body of law other than its own.133
For the past fifty years, federal policymakers have been in-
creasingly adamant in their refusal of the proposition that the
U.S. might be bound by customs or conventions conflicting with
its sense of self-interest.134  More recently, American delegates to
the United Nations have taken to arguing that new codifications
of international law must be written in strict conformity to their
country’s constitutional and even statutory requirements, and
that, for interpretive purposes, the distortions of existing law ad-
vanced by American jurists such as John Marshall be considered
preeminent.135  In effect, the U.S. is seeking to cast an aura of
legitimacy over its ongoing subjugation of American Indians by
131 Noam Chomsky, “What We Say Goes”:  The Middle East in the New World
Order , in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE “NEW WORLD ORDER” AT HOME AND
ABROAD 49 (Cynthia Peters ed., 1992); NOAM CHOMSKY, WORLD ORDERS, OLD
AND NEW (1994). See also ALTERED STATES: A READER IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER (Phyllis Bennis & Michael Moushabeck eds., 1993).
132 Examples of such Bushian rhetoric during the second half of 1990 are legion,
culminating in his announcement during a thirty-four state summit conference con-
ducted in Paris during November, 1990, that the effect of international legality itself
could be “neither profound nor enduring if the rule of law is shamelessly disre-
garded” in the Persian Gulf. Gulf Crisis at a Glance , ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 20,
1990, at A.
133 The U.S. formally repudiated the jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice in 1986, when the ICJ ruled against it in Nicaragua v. United States , 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27, 1986); U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction , 86
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BULL. (Jan. 1986).  It has subsequently refused to accept juris-
diction of the newly-established International Criminal Court (ICC), unless its
policymakers and military personnel are specifically exempted from prosecution.
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:  THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 321-24, 446-48, 450 (1999).  On the U.S. refusal of international
law, per se, see BLUM, supra  note 7, at 184-99; BENNIS, supra  note 102, at 279-82.
134 For an in-depth study of this process at work, see LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1991).
135 Article I(2) of the so-called Sovereignty Package attached to its much-belated
1988 “ratification” of the 1948 Genocide Convention pledges the U.S. to comply
only insofar as “nothing in the Convention requires legislation or other action by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States.” Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package , S.
Exec. Rep. 2, 99th Cong. (1985), adopted Feb. 19, 1986, reprinted in LEBLANC,
supra  note 134, at 253-54.  Such comportment has become so routine that otherwise
establishmentarian analysts have begun to remark upon the traditional Washington
stance that the U.S. is above international law. See id. See generally  Glenn T. Mor-
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engineering a normalization of such relations in universal legal
terms.
A salient example will be found in the ongoing U.S. rejection
of language in the United Nations Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples—and a similar declaration drafted
by the OAS—reiterating that self-determination is guaranteed to
all  peoples by the U.N. Charter.136  Instead, American diplomats
have been instructed to insist that indigenous peoples the world
over must be accorded only a “right of internal  self-determina-
tion” which is “not . . . synonymous with more general under-
standings of self-determination under international law” but
which conforms perfectly with those set forth in the United
States’ own Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assis-
tance Act of 1975.137  Most specifically, as was stated in an offi-
cial cable during January 2001, “the U.S. understanding of the
term ‘internal self-determination’ indicates that it does not in-
clude a right of independence or permanent sovereignty over
natural resources.”138
The standard “explanation” offered by U.S. officials when que-
ried about the legal basis for their government’s position on na-
tive rights has been that “while the United States once
recognized American Indian [peoples] as separate, distinct, and
sovereign nations, it long since stopped doing so.”139  This, how-
ever, is the same, legally speaking, as saying nothing at all.  Ac-
cording to no less an authority than Lassa Oppenheim, author of
the magisterial International Law , voluntary relinquishment is
the sole valid means by which any nation may be divested of its
ris, Further Motion by the State Dep’t to Railroad Indigenous Rights , 6 FOURTH
WORLD BULL. 3; Robertson, supra  note 133, at 327.
136 See generally  Morris, supra  note 135; Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, The Irresisti-
ble Ascension of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
Stopped Short in Its Tracks? , 9 EUR. REV. NATIVE AM. STUDIES 5 (1995).
137 National Security Council cable dated Jan. 18, 2001, reprinted in WARD
CHURCHILL, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERI-
CAN LAW 427 app. (2002).  For background on U.S. posturing at the U.N. with its
Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 405), see S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 86-87, 157 (1996).
138 CHURCHILL, supra  note 137.
139 Leonard Garment offered the formulation during a panel sponsored by Amer-
icans for Indian Opportunity, and televised by C-Span in 1999. See generally supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
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sovereignty.140  Otherwise, “recognition, once given is irrevoca-
ble unless the recognized [nation] ceases to exist.”141  As always,
the U.S. is simply making up its own rules as it goes along.
As should be obvious, the implications of such maneuvers are
by no means confined to a foreclosure upon the rights of native
peoples.  The broader result of American “unilateralism” is that,
just as it did with respect to North America’s indigenous nations,
the U.S. is now extrapolating its presumptive juridical primacy to
global dimensions.142  The initiative is especially dangerous,
given that the place now held by the U.S. within the balance of
world military power closely resembles the lopsided advantage it
enjoyed against American Indians during the nineteenth cen-
tury.143  The upshot is that, should the present trend be allowed
to continue, the United States will shortly have converted most
of the planet into an equivalent of “Indian Country.”144  In fact,
especially with regard to the so-called Third World, this has al-
ready, for all practical intents and purposes, come to pass.145
V
THE NATURE OF MODERN EMPIRE
“It’s an old story, really,” writes Phyllis Bennis, one of “a stra-
tegically unchallenged dominion, at the apogee of its power and
140 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955).
141 Robert T. Coulter, Contemporary Indian Sovereignty , in RETHINKING INDIAN
LAW, 109, 117 (Nat’l Lawyers Guild Comm. on Native Struggles ed., 1982) (citing M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 2 (1963)).
142 As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, later Secretary of State, Made-
leine Albright put it in the mid-1990s, “the U.N. is [merely] a tool of American
foreign policy.”  Catherine Toups, Albright Cites ‘Moral Imperative’ for Bosnia Mis-
sion; Says Public Needs to be Sold on Plan , WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1. See
generally BENNIS, supra  note 104, at 245-312.
143 As the matter was recently framed by French Foreign Minister Hubert
Vedrine, “the predominant weight of the United States and the absence for the mo-
ment of a counterweight . . . leads it to hegemony.”  John Vinoceur, Going It Alone,
U.S. Upsets France; So Paris Begins a Campaign to Strengthen Multilateral Institu-
tions , INT’L HERALD-TRIB. (Paris), Feb. 3, 1999, at A1. See also  Jan Morris, Man-
kind Stirs Uneasily at American Dominance , L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at B9.
144 For an early—and rather prescient—assessment of this prospect, see Sandy
Vogelgesang, AMERICAN DREAM GLOBAL NIGHTMARE:  THE DILEMMA OF U.S.
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (1980).
145 See EDUARDO GALEANO, THE OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA:  FIVE CEN-
TURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT 225-83 (Cedric Belfrage trans., Monthly
Review Press, 1973) (1971); see also EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION:  THE UNITED
STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD SINCE 1945 (Peter L. Hahn & Mary Ann Heiss
eds., 2001).
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influence, rewriting the global rules for how to manage its em-
pire.  Two thousand years ago, Thucydides described how Mylos,
the island the Greeks conquered to ensure stability for their Em-
pire’s golden age, was invaded and occupied according to laws
wholly different from those governing democratic (if slavery de-
pendent) Athens.  The Roman empire followed suit, creating one
set of laws for Rome’s own citizens, imposing another on its far-
flung possessions.  In the last couple of hundred years the sun-
never-sets-on-us British empire did much the same thing.  And
then, at the end of the twentieth century, having achieved once
unimaginable heights of military, economic, and political power,
it was Washington’s turn.”146
The American-style fin de 20th siecle  law of empire took the
form of the U.S. exempting itself from UN-brokered treaties
and other international agreements that it demanded others
accept.  It was evident in Washington’s rejection of the Inter-
national Criminal Court in 1998, its refusal to sign the 1997
Convention against anti-personnel land mines, its failures [to
accept] the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Law of
the Sea, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and more.147
Actually, the roots of the current U.S. posture run much
deeper than Bennis suggests.  As its record concerning the ear-
lier-mentioned California Indian treaties readily demonstrates,
the United States had by the mid-1850s already adopted a policy
of selectively exempting itself from compliance with treaties to
which it asserted others were nonetheless bound.148  The Su-
preme Court’s 1903 opinion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock  effec-
tively extended this procedure to encompass all treaties and
agreements with indigenous nations.149  From there, it became
only a matter of time before the U.S. would begin to approach
the remainder of its foreign relations in a comparable manner.150
146 BENNIS, supra  note 104, at 262-63. Deviation from THE BLUEBOOK quotation
Rule 5.1 due to author’s preference. See THE BLUEBOOK:  A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION R.5.1, at 43-44 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
147 Id.
148 See supra  note 108. See also FLORENCE CONNOLLY SHIPEK, PUSHED INTO
THE ROCKS:  SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INDIAN LAND TENURE, 1769-1986 (1988).
149 See supra  note 76.  For additional discussion of the peculiarly one-sided and
legally unfounded notion of treaty abrogation implicit to the opinion, see BLUE
CLARK, LONE WOLF V. HITCHCOCK:  TREATY RIGHTS AND INDIAN LAW AT THE
END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 4-5, 70-74, 110 (1994).
150 During the 1997 conference in Ottawa which resulted in promulgation of the
Convention on Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, to cite one notorious example, U.S.
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As well, the attitude, first explicated with regard to Indians and
now displayed quite prominently on the global stage, that
America is endowed with a plenary authority to dictate the “per-
missible” forms of other countries’ governmental and political
processes, the modes of their economies and so on.151
Legal scholar Felix S. Cohen once accurately analogized
American Indians as a “miner’s canary” providing early warning
of the fate in store for other sectors of the U.S. populace.152  The
principle can now be projected to worldwide proportions.  Given
the scale of indignity and sheer physical suffering the U.S. has
inflicted—and continues to inflict—upon indigenous peoples
trapped within its “domestic” domain,153 it is self-evidently in the
representatives argued straightforwardly that the treaty should bind every  country in
the world except  theirs.  When the 129 signatory states in attendance refused to ac-
cept the premise that the U.S. should be uniquely exempted from compliance, the
U.S. delegation withdrew in a huff. ROBERTSON, supra  note 131, at 198-99; BENNIS,
supra  note 104, at 279-80.  As of this writing (Feb. 2003), the U.S. has still not en-
dorsed the Convention, although it went into force in March 1999.  Instead, it has
indulged in a flagrant violation by dropping thousands of cluster bombs—outlawed
under the treaty—on Afghanistan since October 2001.
151 Upon even cursory examination, it becomes evident that virtually every one of
the multitudinous post-World War II U.S. military/paramilitary interventions abroad
has been harnessed to these ends. See , e.g. , NOAM CHOMSKY, DETERRING DEMOC-
RACY (Hill & Wang, 1992) (1991); NOAM CHOMSKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST
CONTINUES (1993).  It should be noted that, according to no less authoritative a
figure than Secretary of State Colin Powell, the U.S., having employed criminal
means to replace Afghanistan’s Taliban régime with a government of its own choos-
ing in late 2001, is now gearing up to do the same in Iraq (Iran and North Korea
have been named as likely follow-ups).  It should also be noted that military force
has not been the only means employed to accomplish the subordination of other
countries, nor have the victims necessarily been confined to the Third World. See ,
e.g. , STEPHEN MCBRIDE & JOHN SHIELDS, DISMANTLING A NATION: THE TRANSI-
TION TO CORPORATE RULE IN CANADA (2d ed. 1997).
152 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53:  A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J., 348, 390 (1953).
153 Despite our retention of the largest landholdings on a per capita basis of any
North American population group, and despite that land being some of the most
mineral-rich in the world, internal colonial exploitation of our resources by the U.S.
has left American Indians in a material circumstance so degraded that by the late
1990s our average lifespan was one-third less than that of the settler population.
Overall, the
Indian health level is the lowest and the disease rate the highest of all ma-
jor population groups in the United States.  The incidence of tuberculosis is
over 400 percent higher than the national average.  Similar statistics show
that the incidence of strep infections is 1,000 percent, meningitis is 2,000
percent higher, and dysentery is 10,000 percent higher.  Death rates from
disease are shocking when Indian and non-Indian populations are com-
pared.  Influenza and pneumonia are 300 percent greater killers among In-
dians.  Diseases such as hepatitis are at epidemic proportions, with an 800
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best interests of very nearly the entire human species to force-
fully reject the structure of “unjust legality” by which the U.S. is
attempting to rationalize its ambition to consolidate a position of
planetary suzerainty.154 The only reasonable question is how best
to go about it.
Here, the choice is between combating the endless array of
symptoms emanating from the problem or going after it at its
source, eradicating it root and branch, once and for all.  Again,
the more reasonable alternative is self-revealing.  Unerringly,
then, the attention of those desiring to block America’s increas-
ingly global reach must be focused upon unpacking the accumu-
lation of casuistic jurisprudence employed by the U.S. as a
justification for its own geographical configuration.155  Since, as
has been established herein, there is no viable basis for the
United States to assert territorial rights based on the concept of
terra nullius  or any other aspect of discovery doctrine, and even
less on rights of conquest, it is left with a legally defensible claim
to only those parcels of the continent where it obtained title
through a valid treaty.  As has also been shown herein, this adds
up to something less than half its professed North American ter-
ritoriality.  To its “overseas possessions” such as Guam, Puerto
Rico, and Hawai‘i, the U.S. holds no legal right at all.156
percent higher chance of death.  Diabetes is almost a plague.  And the sui-
cide rate for Indian youths ranges from 1,000 to 10,000 percent higher than
for non-Indian youths; Indian suicide has become epidemic.
RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO’S REVENGE:  REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN
CULTURE AND POLICY 53 (1997).  Entirely comparable data applies to the Kanaka
Maoli (Native Hawaiians). See  Kekuni Blaisdell & Noreen Mokuau, Kañaka Maoli,
Indigenous Hawaiians , in HAWAI‘I:  RETURN TO NATIONHOOD 49 (Ulla Hasager &
Jonathan Friedman eds., Greenwood Press 1991).
154 The term employed originates with Jürgen Habermas. See JAMES L. MARSH,
UNJUST LEGALITY:  A CRITIQUE OF HABERMAS’S LAW (2001).
155 For further development of the themes sketched in this section, see Ward
Churchill, I Am Indigenist , in WARD CHURCHILL, ACTS OF REBELLION:  A WARD
CHURCHILL READER 275 (2002); see also  Ward Churchill, The New Face of Libera-
tion , in CHURCHILL, ACTS OF REBELLION, at 263.
156 The U.S. Congress actually issued a statutory apology to the Kanaka Maoli on
the 100th anniversary of its admittedly illegal participation in the armed overthrow
of Hawai‘i’s constitutional monarchy.  S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong., 107 Stat. 1510
(1993).  Signed by President Bill Clinton on Nov. 23, 1993, id. , Public Law 103-150
made no offer to restore the native people’s property and other sovereign rights.
Nor did it mention that Hawai‘i’s being declared a U.S. state in 1959 was accom-
plished in a manner violating the requirements of Chapter IX of the U.N. Charter,
and was thus simply another illegality. See HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE
DAUGHTER:  COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI’I 27-32 (2d ed. 1999).  On
Guam, see CHAMORRO SELF-DETERMINATION (Robert Underwood & Laura
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Viewed from any angle, the situation is obvious.  Shorn of its
illegally-occupied territories, the U.S. would lack the critical mass
and internal jurisdictional cohesion necessary to impose itself as
it does at present.  This is all the more true in that even the frag-
ments of land still delineated as Indian reservations are known to
contain up to two-thirds of the uranium, a quarter of the readily-
accessible low sulfur coal, a fifth of the oil and natural gas, and
all of the zeolites available to feed America’s domestic econ-
omy.157  Withdrawal of these assets from federal control would
fatally impair the ability of the U.S. to sustain anything resem-
bling state-corporate business as usual.  By every reasonable
standard of measure, the decolonization of Native North
America must thus be among the very highest priorities pursued
by anyone, anywhere who is seriously committed to achieving a
positive transformation of the global status quo.158
A major barrier to international coalescence around this sort
of “deconstructionist” agenda, among sworn enemies of the U.S.
no less than its allies, has been the exclusively statist “world or-
der”159—or “world system,” as Immanuel Wallerstein terms
it160—in which both sides are invested.  Only states  are eligible
Souder eds., 1987).  On Puerto Rico, see RONALD FERNANDEZ, PRISONERS OF
COLONIALISM:  THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN PUERTO RICO (1994); see also FOR-
EIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE:  PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CON-
STITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).  By far the best
overview of federal holdings, including such little-considered places as “American”
Samoa and the “U.S.” Virgin Islands, will be found in ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DE-
FINING STATUS:  A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL
RELATIONS (1989).
157 Ronald L. Trosper, American Indian Mineral Agreements , in AMERICAN IN-
DIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, TASK FORCE SEVEN FINAL REPORT:  RESERVA-
TION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 137 app. (1976);
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1984).
158 My use of the word “seriously” here is intended in opposition to the liberal
notion that solutions to the kinds of intractable socioeconomic, political, and envi-
ronmental problems generated by the existing system can somehow be obtained
through recourse to the system itself.  Regardless of the rhetorical militancy in which
such propositions are often larded, they are inherently superficial and ultimately
reinforcing of systemic hegemony. See ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE,
HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLIT-
ICS (2d ed. 2001).
159 For some of the better descriptions of the statist system, see BOYLE, supra
note 93; see also HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY:  A STUDY OF ORDER
IN WORLD POLITICS (1977); FRITZ KRATOCHWIL, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER (1978).
160 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM I:  CAPITALIST AG-
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for membership in the United Nations , for instance, a conflation
which once caused American Indian Movement leader Russell
Means to quip that “the organization would more rightly have
been called the United States, but the name was already
taken.”161  Although it may be no surprise to find a veritable U.S.
appendage like Canada citing John Marshall’s McIntosh  opinion
as “the locus classicus  of the principles governing aboriginal ti-
tle” in the formulation of its own judicial doctrine,162 it is quite
another matter to find the then-still decolonizing countries of Af-
rica adopting the thinking embodied in Cherokee Nation  to en-
sure that the “national borders” demarcated by their European
colonizers would be preserved in international law.163
RICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIX-
TEENTH CENTURY (1974); IMMANUAL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-
SYSTEM II:  MERCANTILISM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-
ECONOMY, 1600-1750 (1988); IMMANUAL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-
SYSTEM III:  THE SECOND ERA OF GREAT EXPANSION OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-
ECONOMY, 1730-1840S (1989).  For further discussion, see THE WORLD SYSTEM:
FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OR FIVE THOUSAND? (Andre Gunder Frank & Barry K.
Ellis eds., 1993).
161 Russell Means, Address at the Four Winds Community Center, Denver, CO
(Oct. 7, 1996) (notes on file with author).  Concerning the distinction at issue, see
HUGH SETON-WATSON, NATIONS AND STATES:  AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF
NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM (1977). See also  Bernard
Nietschmann, The Fourth World:  Nations versus States , in REORDERING THE
WORLD:  GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 21ST CENTURY 225 (George J.
Demko & William B. Wood eds., 2d ed. 1999).
162 Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 380.  In
concluding that the federal government of Canada enjoys a unilateral prerogative to
extinguish indigenous rights, the court noted that it had been “unable to find a Ca-
nadian case dealing precisely with this subject” and that it would therefore rely on a
U.S. judicial interpretation found in Idaho v. Coffee , 556 P.2d 1185 (Idaho 1976).
See  Ontario v. Bear Island Found., [1989] O.R. 2d 394, 412-413, aff’d , [1991] S.C.R.
570.  The first example of this sort will be found in the 1867 Québec case Connolly v.
Woolrich, [1867] 17 R.J.R.Q. 75, in which the court, considering the validity of a
marriage effected under native tradition for purposes of determining inheritance
rights, repeated verbatim a lengthy passage from Marshall’s Worcester  opinion. See
John Hurley, Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution and the Marshall Court , 17 REVUE
JURIDIQUE THEMIS 403 (1983); STAN PERSKY, DELGAMUUKW:  THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA DECISION ON ABORIGINAL TITLE (1998).
163 At the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the European powers partitioned Africa
in accordance with their own interests on the continent.  The resulting demarcation
of colonial boundaries conforms rather precisely to borders claimed by most
“postcolonial” African states today. See JOHN M. MACKENZIE, THE PARTITION OF
AFRICA, 1880-1900, AND EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 28
(1983) (containing a map of the 1885 colonial boundaries).  For background on the
Berlin Conference, see THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, 1876 TO
1912:  THE WHITE MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT (1991).  For obser-
vations on the outcome(s), see BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN:  AF-
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This came about during United Nations debates concerning its
1960 Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples.  Belgium, in the process of relinquishing
its grip on the Congo, advanced the thesis that if terms like
decolonization and self-determination were to have meaning, the
various “tribal” peoples whose homelands it had forcibly incor-
porated into its colony would each have to be accorded the right
to resume independent existence.  Otherwise, the Belgians ar-
gued, colonialism would simply be continued in another form,
with the indigenous peoples involved arbitrarily subordinated to
a centralized authority presiding over a territorial dominion cre-
ated not by Africans but by Belgium itself.164  To this, European-
educated Congolese insurgents like Patrice Lumumba, backed by
their colleagues in the newly-emergent Organization of African
Unity (OAU), counterpoised what is called the “Blue Water
Principle,” that is, the idea that to be considered a bona fide col-
ony—and thus entitled to exercise the self-determining rights
guaranteed by both the Declaration and the U.N. Charter—a
country or people had to be separated from its colonizer by at
least thirty miles of open ocean.165
Although the Blue Water Principle made no more sense during
the early 1960s than it had when Justice Smith Thompson rebut-
ted John Marshall’s initial iteration of it in 1831, it was quickly
embraced by U.N. member states and Third World revolutionary
movements alike.166  For the member states, whether capitalist
(First World) or socialist (Second World), adoption of the princi-
RICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992); ANTHONY D. SMITH, STATE
AND NATION IN THE THIRD WORLD:  THE WESTERN STATE AND AFRICAN NATION-
ALISM 124-35 (1983).
164 The “Belgian Thesis,” as it was called, had been articulated for more than a
decade prior to the U.N. debate. See , e.g. , FOREIGN MINISTRY OF BELGIUM, THE
SACRED MISSION OF CIVILIZATION:  TO WHICH PEOPLES SHOULD THE BENEFIT BE
EXTENDED? (1953).
165 On the Blue Water Principle itself, see Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Protection of
American Indian Territories in the United States:  Applicability of International Law ,
in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA, supra  note 111, at 247, 260-61.  For insights on the
eurocentrism of the logic guiding Lumumba and his counterparts, see Partha Chat-
terjee, Nationalism as a Problem in the History of Political Ideas , in NATIONALIST
THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE 1 (1986).
166 Indeed, some Third Worlders felt that both the principle and its OAU endors-
ers did not go far enough.  Rather than simply preserving the individuated-state
structure inherited from European colonialism, Pan-Africanists like Kwame
Nkrumah sought to forge a single continental “megastate” along the lines of the U.S.
or the USSR. See ELENGA M’BUYINGA, PAN-AFRICANISM OR NEO-COLONIALISM:
THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE O.A.U. (Michael Pallis trans., Zed Press 1982) (1975);
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ple served to consecrate the existing disposition of their “inter-
nal” territoriality, irrespective of how it may have been obtained.
For the Third World’s marxian revolutionaries, it offered the
same prospect, albeit quite often with regard to positions of
“post-colonial” state authority to which they were at the time still
aspiring.167  For either side to acknowledge that a “Fourth
World” comprised of indigenous nations168 might possess the
least right to genuine self-determination would have been, and
remains, to dissolve the privileged status of the state system to
which both sides are not only conceptually wedded but owe their
very existence.169
The stakes embodied in this denial are staggering.  There are
twenty different indigenous peoples along the peninsula British
colonizers called Malaya (now Malaysia), 380 in “post-colonial”
India, and 670 in the former Dutch/Portuguese colony of Indone-
sia.170  In South America, the numbers range from thirty-five in
Ecuador to 210 in Brazil.171  There are scores, including such
large nationalities as the Yi, Manchus and Miao, encapsulated
within the Peoples Republic of China.172  In Vietnam, two dozen-
odd “montagnard tribes” of the Annamese Cordillera have been
unwillingly subsumed under authority of what the Vietnamese
constitution unilaterally proclaims “a multinational state.”173
KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM:  THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (Int’l
Publishers, 1966) (1965).
167 See NATIONAL LIBERATION:  REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (Norman
Miller & Roderick Aya, eds., 1971).  More theoretically, see Ward Churchill, False
Promises:  An Indigenist Examination of Marxist Theory and Practice , in CHURC-
HILL, ACTS OF REBELLION, supra  note 155, at 247.
168 See generally  Nietschmann, supra  note 161; GEORGE MANUEL & MICHAEL
POSLUNS, THE FOURTH WORLD:  AN INDIAN REALITY (1974).  At least one writer
has referred to the Fourth World as being a “Host World” upon which the other
three have been constructed.  Winona LaDuke, Preface:  Natural to Synthetic and
Back Again , in  Marxism and Native Americans, at i (Ward Churchill ed., 1983).
169 See FRANZ SCHURMANN, THE LOGIC OF WORLD POWER (1974); JACQUELINE
STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE (1999).
170 Nietschmann, supra  note 161, at 240.
171 Id.  For background, see GREG URBAN & JOEL SHERZER, NATION STATES
AND INDIANS IN LATIN AMERICA (1991).
172 For a partial overview, see June Tenfel Dryer, The Problem of Nationality:
China’s Quest for a Socialist Solution , in PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 51 (1975), re-
printed in WALKER CONNOR, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN MARXIST-LENINIST
THEORY AND STRATEGY 70 (1984) (referring to a map of China’s “minority
nationalities”).
173 Id.  at 116.  For more on the Montagnards, see generally CHURCHILL, ACTS OF
REBELLION, supra  note 155, at 247.
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The same situation prevails for the Hmongs of Laos.174  Not only
the Chechens of the south but at least three-dozen smaller north-
ern peoples remain trapped within the Russian rump state result-
ing from the breakup of the Soviet Union.175  In Iraq and Turkey,
there are the Kurds;176 in Libya and Morocco, the Bedouins of
the desert regions.177  Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, hundreds
more, many of them partitioned by borders defended at gunpoint
by statist régimes, share the circumstance of the rest.178  Similar
situations prevail in every quarter of the earth.179
Observed from this standpoint, it’s easy enough to see why no
state, regardless of how bitterly opposed it might otherwise be to
the United States, has been—or could be—willing to attack the
U.S. where it is most vulnerable.  The vulnerability being decid-
edly mutual, any precedent thus established would directly con-
tradict the attacking state’s sense of self-preservation at the most
fundamental level.  Hence, the current process of militarily-en-
forced politico-economic “globalization”180—world imperialism,
by any other name181—must be viewed as a collaborative en-
174 See generally  Glenn T. Morris & Ward Churchill, Between a Rock and a Hard
Place:  Left-Wing Revolution, Right-Wing Reaction and the Destruction of Indigenous
Peoples , 11 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 17 (1988).
175 On Chechnya, see Bradford L. Thomas, International Boundaries:  Lines in the
Sand (and Sea) , in REORDERING THE WORLD, supra  note 161, at 72.  With respect
to the smaller peoples, see Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North , IWGIA Doc. No.
67 (July 1990).  On the nations which gained a measure of genuine independence as
a result of the Soviet breakup, see HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D’ENCAUSSE, THE END OF
THE SOVIET EMPIRE:  THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIONS (Franklin Phillip trans., 1993);
THE POST-SOVIET NATIONS:  PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEMISE OF THE USSR (Alexan-
der J. Motyl ed., 2d ed. 1992).
176 See generally A PEOPLE WITHOUT A COUNTRY:  THE KURDS AND KURDISTAN
(Gerard Chaliand ed., 2d ed. 1993).
177 JONATHAN BEARMAN, QADHAFI’S LIBYA (1986); TONY HODGES, WESTERN
SAHARA:  THE ROOTS OF A DESERT WAR (1983).
178 See generally  9 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. (1985) (a special-focus issue entitled
Nation, Tribe and Ethnic Group in Africa). See also MALCOLM N. SHAW, TITLE TO
TERRITORY IN AFRICA:  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (1986).
179 SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN & HASSAN BIN TALAL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:  A
GLOBAL QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1987); JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRON-
TIER:  THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1987).
180 See RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION:  A CRITIQUE (1999). See
also  James H. Mittleman, How Does Globalization Really Work? , in GLOBALIZA-
TION:  CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 229 (James H. Mittleman ed., 1997); See generally
GLOBALIZATION:  CRITICAL REFLECTIONS (James H. Mittleman ed., 1997).
181 See FRANK FÜREDI, THE NEW IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM:  RENEWING THE
MORAL IMPERATIVE (1994); see also JAMES PETRAS & HENRY VELTMEYER,
GLOBALIZATION UNMASKED:  IMPERIALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Douglas Beall
ed., 2001); ASH NARAIN ROY, THE THIRD WORLD IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION:
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deavor, involving even those states which stand to suffer most as
a result (and which have therefore been most vociferously critical
of it).  It follows that genuine and effective opposition can only
accrue from locations outside “official” venues, at the grassroots,
among those who understand their interests as being antithetical,
not only to globalization, per se, but to the entire statist structure
upon which it depends.182
VI
RETURNING THE LAW TO ITS FEET
It’s not that native peoples are especially accepting of their lot,
as has been witnessed by such bloody upheavals as Katanga and
Biafra since 1960.183  In 1987, cultural anthropologist Bernard
Nietschmann conducted a global survey in which he discovered
that of 125 armed conflicts occurring at the time, fully eighty-five
percent —amounting to a “third world war,” in his view—were
being fought between indigenous nations and states claiming an
inherent right to dominate them.184  Among the sharper clashes
have been the ongoing guerrilla struggles waged by the Kurds,185
the Nagas of the India/Burma border region,186 the southern
Karens and northern Kachens of Burma (Myanmar),187 the
Tamils of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon),188 the Pacific islanders of
REQUIEM OR NEW AGENDA? (1999). See generally ALBERT SZYMANSKI, THE
LOGIC OF IMPERIALISM 123-216 (1981).
182 For an interesting iteration of more-or-less the same perception, see GUSTAVO
ESTEVA & MADHU SURI PRAKASH, GRASSROOTS POSTMODERNISM:  REMAKING
THE SOIL OF CULTURES (1998). See also JOHN ZERZAN, ELEMENTS OF REFUSAL (2d
ed. 1999).
183 See , e.g. , JULES GERARD-LIBOIS, KATANGA SECESSION (Rebecca Young
trans., The Univ. of Wis. Press 1966) (1963); HERBERT EKWE ELWE, THE BIAFRA
WAR:  NIGERIA AND THE AFTERMATH (1990); CHUCKUEMEKA ODUMEGWE
DJUKWU, BIATRA (1969).
184 Bernard Nietschmann, The Third World War , 11 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 1
(1987).
185 See generally A PEOPLE WITHOUT A COUNTRY, supra  note 176.
186 See ISAK CHISI SWU & TH. MUIVA, FREE NAGALAND MANIFESTO (1993). See
generally  13 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. (1989) (a special-focus issue entitled India:
Cultures in Crisis).
187 See  Edith T. Mirante, Ethnic Minorities of the Burma Frontiers and Their Re-
sistance Organizations , in SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIBAL GROUPS AND ETHNIC MINOR-
ITIES 59 (1987). See also  13 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. (1980) (a special-focus issue
devoted to the situation in Burma).
188 The Tamils in Sri Lanka , IWGIA Newsletter  (Int’l Work Group for Indigenous
Affairs, Copenhagen, Den.), Aug. 1989, at 10. See also LAKSHMANAN
SABARATNAM, ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS IN SRI LANKA (2002).
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Belau, Fiji and elsewhere,189 the so-called Moro peoples of the
southern Philippines,190 the Timorese and Papuans of Indone-
sia,191 as well as the Miskito and other native peoples of Nicara-
gua’s Atlantic coast.192  To this list may now be added the series
of revolts in Chechnya193 and the recent Mayan insurgency in the
Mexican province of Chiapas.194
The list extends as well to the venerable states of western Eu-
rope.  In Spain, the Basques, and to a lesser degree the Catalans,
have been waging a protracted armed struggle to free themselves
from incorporation into a country of which they never consented
to be a part.195  In France, aside from the Basques around Na-
varre, there are the Celtic Bretons of the Channel coast.196  The
Irish are continuing their eight-century-long military campaign to
reclaim the whole of their island,197 while, on the “English Isle”
itself, the Welsh, Scots and Cornish—Celtic peoples all—have in-
creasingly taken to asserting their rights to autonomy.198  So, too,
the Celtic Manxmen on the Isle of Mann.199  Far to the north, the
189 See DAVID ROBIE, BLOOD ON THEIR BANNER:  NATIONALIST STRUGGLES IN
THE SOUTH PACIFIC (1989).
190 See JOSEPH COLLINS, THE PHILIPPINES:  FIRE ON THE RIM 129-202 (1989).
191 See , e.g. , JOHN G. TAYLOR, INDONESIA’S FORGOTTEN WAR:  THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF EAST TIMOR (1991).
192 See generally BERNARD NIETSCHMANN, THE UNKNOWN WAR:  THE MISKITO
NATION, NICARAGUA, AND THE UNITED STATES (1989). See also  Morris & Churc-
hill, supra  note 174.
193 For a good overview, see JOHN K. COOLEY, UNHOLY WARS:  AFGHANISTAN,
AMERICA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 174-84 (2d ed. 2000).
194 See JOHN ROSS, THE WAR AGAINST OBLIVION:  THE ZAPATISTA CHRONICLES
(2000).
195 See , e.g. , ROBERT P. CLARK, NEGOTIATING WITH ETA:  OBSTACLES TO
PEACE IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY, 1975-1988 (William A. Douglas ed., 1990); JOHN
SULLIVAN, ETA AND BASQUE NATIONALISM: A FIGHT FOR EUSKADI 1890-1986 (2d
ed. 1988); CYRUS ERNESTO ZIRAKZADEH, A REBELLIOUS PEOPLE:  BASQUES, PRO-
TESTS, AND POLITICS (William A. Douglas ed., 1991); JOSEBA ZULAIKA, BASQUE
VIOLENCE:  METAPHOR AND SACRAMENT (William A. Douglas, ed., 1988).
196 On the “French Basques,” see PADDY WOODWORTH, DIRTY WAR, CLEAN
HANDS:  ETA, THE GAL AND SPANISH DEMOCRACY 87-99 (2001).  On the Bretons,
see PETER BERRESFORD ELLIS, THE CELTIC REVOLUTION:  A STUDY IN ANTI-IMPE-
RIALISM 54-75 (1985).
197 CIARAN DE BAROID, BALLYMURPHY AND THE IRISH WAR (2d ed. 2000); PAD-
RAIG O’MALLEY, THE UNCIVIL WARS:  IRELAND TODAY (Beacon Press, 1990)
(1983).
198 On the construction of the English domain, see MICHAEL HECTOR, INTERNAL
COLONIALISM: THE CELTIC FRINGE IN BRITISH NATIONAL DEVELOP-MENT, 1536-
1966 (1975).  On the liberation struggle, see ELLIS, supra  note 196, at 28-53, 76-97,
134-48. See also GWYNFOR EVANS, FIGHTING FOR WALES (1991); H.J. HANHAM,
SCOTTISH NATIONALISM (1969).
199 ELLIS, supra  note 196, at 139-64.
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Saamis (“Laps”) are also pursuing their right to determine for
themselves the relationship of Saamiland (their traditional terri-
tory, usually referred to as “Lapland”) vis-à-vis Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Russia.200  In Greenland, the primarily Inuit popula-
tion, having already achieved a “home rule” arrangement with
their Danish colonizers, are pushing for full independence.201  In
Canada, there have been armed insurgencies by native peoples at
Oka, Gustafsen Lake and elsewhere, as well as the emergence of
a tentatively autonomous Inuit territory called Nunavut.202
Those who see dismantlement of the present U.S. territorial/
power configuration as the pivot point of constructive change are
thus presented with the prospect of linking up with a vibrantly
global Fourth World liberation movement, one which has never
been quelled, and which cannot be satisfied until what Leopold
Kohr once called the “breakdown of nations”—by which he actu-
ally meant the breakdown of states—has been everywhere ac-
complished.203  Dire predictions concerning the horrors
supposedly attending “the coming anarchy,”204 blink the fact that
the hegemony of statism has generated an estimated fifty million
corpses from wars alone over the past half-century.205  Adding in
those lost to the “underdevelopment” and “diseconomies of
scale” inherent to the world system as it is now constituted would
increase the body count at least twenty times over.206  Also to be
200 For a map of Saamiland, see IWGIA Newsletter  (Int’l Work Group for Indige-
nous Affairs, Copenhagen, Den.), No. 51/52 Oct./Dec. 1987, at 84.
201 Jens Dahl, Greenland:  General Election Supports Continuing Decolonization ,
IWGIA Newsletter  (Int’l Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, Den.),
Oct./Dec. 1987, at 41-44.
202 See OLIVE PATRICIA DICKASON, CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS:  A HISTORY OF
FOUNDING PEOPLES FROM EARLIEST TIMES 414-15 (1992); JANICE G.A.E. SWITLO,
GUSTAFSON LAKE:  UNDER SIEGE:  EXPOSING THE TRUTH BEHIND THE GUSTAFSON
LAKE STAND-OFF (1997); GEOFFREY YORK & LOREEN PINDERA, PEOPLE OF THE
PINES:  THE WARRIORS AND THE LEGACY OF OKA (1991).
203 LEOPOLD KOHR, THE BREAKDOWN OF NATIONS (1957).
204 See ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY:  SHATTERING THE DREAMS
OF THE POST COLD WAR (2000).  Kaplan and others of his ilk delight in pointing to
the bloodbath in the former Yugoslavia as previewing far worse to come, were the
statist system to disintegrate. See , e.g. , BOGDAN DENITCH, ETHNIC NATIONALISM:
THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (1994).  Ignored altogether in such analyses
are the facts that the animus provoking such bloodletting is a legacy of statist imposi-
tion on the one hand, and efforts to reimpose centralized state authority on the
other.
205 BENNIS, supra  note 104, at 274.
206 See , e.g. , SAMIR AMIN, MALDEVELOPMENT:  ANATOMY OF A GLOBAL FAIL-
URE (1990); JAMES D. COCKCROFT ET AL., DEPENDENCE AND UNDERDEVELOP-
MENT:  LATIN AMERICA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY (1972); LEOPOLD KOHR, THE
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 43 30-SEP-03 8:55
The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head 705
considered is the radical and rapidly accelerating truncation of
fundamental rights and liberties undertaken by all states—the
“freedom-loving” U.S. far more than most of those it condemns
as “totalitarian”—in order to concretize and reinforce their im-
position of centralized authority.207  As well, the massive and un-
precedented degree of cultural “leveling” entailed in the
systematic and state-anchored transnational corporate drive to
rationalize production and unify markets the world over.208
Rectifying John Marshall’s seminal inversion of international
legal principle—negating his negation, so to speak209—and thus
“returning the law to its feet”210 would serve to undermine one
of the most potent components of the master narrative through
which statism and its imperial collaterals have been presented as
though they were natural, inevitable and somehow beneficial to
all concerned.211  General exposure, in their own terms, of the
OVERDEVELOPED NATIONS:  THE DISECONOMIES OF SCALE (Schocken Books 1978)
(1977); NEIL SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT:  NATURE, CAPITAL AND THE PRO-
DUCTION OF SPACE (1984). See generally IAN ROXBOROUGH, THEORIES OF UN-
DERDEVELOPMENT (1979).
207 See FRANK HARRISON, THE MODERN STATE:  AN ANARCHIST ANALYSIS
(1983); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA:  POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE
AGE OF CRISIS (1999); ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1998) (1970).
208 As Antonio de Nebrija famously put it in 1492, language might be seen as “a
perfect companion to empire” in the sense that the colonizer’s imposition of his own
tongue upon the colonized would serve to undermine the latter’s cultural integrity
and concomitant capacity to resist subordination. See PATRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES
OF POSSESSION IN EUROPE’S CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD, 1492-1640, at 8
(1995).  By the 1880s, linguistic imposition had progressed to a program of systemat-
ically supplanting indigenous languages. See , e.g. , DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDU-
CATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL
EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928, at 137-42 (1995) (estimating that today, fully half the
world’s 6,000-odd languages are in danger of disappearance within the next few
years, and half the remainder over the coming generation); MARTIN CARNOY, EDU-
CATION AS CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 69-72 (1974).
209 See MICHAEL ALBERT & ROBIN HAHNEL, UNORTHODOX MARXISM:  AN ES-
SAY ON CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND REVOLUTION 14-16 (1978).
210 Glenn T. Morris, Lecture at Alfred University (Oct. 14, 1990) (tape on file
with author).
211 On the concept of “Master Narratives”—also known as “Great” or “Grand”
Narratives, as well as “metanarratives,” see FREDRIC JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCON-
SCIOUS:  NARRATIVE AS SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT (1981).  In the sense the term is
used here, it figures into the Gramscian notion of hegemony. See WALTER L.
ADAMSON, HEGEMONY AND REVOLUTION:  A STUDY OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI’S PO-
LITICAL AND CULTURAL THEORY 170-79 (1980); Judith Butler, Restaging the Univer-
sal:  Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism , in JUDITH BUTLER ET AL.,
CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTEMPORARY DIA-LOGUES ON THE
LEFT 11 (2000).
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falsity intrinsic to such “truths” stands to evoke a “legitimation
crisis” of such proportions and intractability that the statist sys-
tem could not sustain itself.212  This “end of world order”213—or,
more accurately, transformative reordering of international rela-
tions214—in favor of a devolution of state structures into some-
thing resembling the interactive clusters or federations of “mini-
nationalisms”215 which were the norm before the advent of Euro-
pean hegemony,216 restoring human scale and bioregional sensi-
bility to the affairs of peoples, can only be seen as a positive
trajectory.217
Putting a name to it is a more difficult proposition, however.
Insofar as its thrust centers in a wholesale (re)assertion of the
rights of Fourth World peoples, such a path might correctly be
depicted as an “indigenist alternative.”218  Still, given that so
sweeping a reconfiguration of humanity’s relationship with itself
and its habitat must encompass those who are of the Fourth
World in neither identity nor present orientation, the old standby
of “anarchism” might well prove a more apt descriptor.219  Re-
gardless of its labeling, the result will inevitably be far more just,
and thus more liberatory, than that it will replace.  And to that
we might all  aspire.
212 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973).
213 Richard Falk, Political Prospects, Cultural Choices, Anthropological Horizons ,
in THE END OF WORLD ORDER:  ESSAYS IN NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 315 (Richard Falk ed., 1983).
214 See, e.g. , David B. Knight, People Together, Yet Apart:  Rethinking Territory,
Sovereignty, and Identities , in REORDERING THE WORLD, supra  note 161, at 209-26.
215 LOUIS L. SNYDER, GLOBAL MINI-NATIONALISMS:  AUTONOMY OR INDE-
PENDENCE? (1982).
216 JANET L. ABU-LUGHOD, BEFORE EUROPEAN HEGEMONY:  THE WORLD SYS-
TEM A.D. 1250-1350 (1989).  For an overview of the transition to the current world
system, see WALLERSTEIN, supra  note 160; CONQUEST AND COALESCENCE:  THE
SHAPING OF THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (Mark Greenglass ed., 1991).
217 KIRKPATRICK SALE, DWELLERS IN THE LAND:  THE BIOREGIONAL VISION
(1991); KIRKPATRICK SALE, HUMAN SCALE (1980).
218 See  2 THE INDIGENOUS VOICE:  VISIONS AND REALITIES (Roger Moody ed.,
1988).
219 See  Richard Falk, Anarchism and World Order , in END OF WORLD ORDER,
supra  note 213, at 277-98. See also HARVEY STARR, ANARCHY, ORDER, AND INTE-
GRATION:  HOW TO MANAGE INTERDEPENDENCE (1999).  For a more concrete ex-
ploration of how an anarchist arrangement of international relations might look in
practice, see JUAN GÓMEZ CASAS, ANARCHIST ORGANIZATION:  THE HISTORY OF
THE F.A.I. (Abe Bluestein trans., 1986).
